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ABSTRACT 
In response to the persistent under-representation of women, African Americans and other 
minorities on juries, the Supreme Court, in a series of celebrated decisions during the early years of 
the Burger Court, held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial included the right to have 
the jury selected from a ‘fair cross-section’ of society.  In light of the Equal Protection Clause’s 
limitations, this ‘fair cross-section’ requirement held much promise as a means of ensuring more 
representative juries.  Yet, less than four decades later, the ‘fair cross-section’ requirement has 
largely come to a jurisprudential standstill. 
Scholars have traced the stagnation of the once-promising jurisprudence in part to a doctrinal 
conflict created by the Court’s construction of the ‘fair cross-section’ requirement and a paradox 
resulting from the manner in which the Court later limited the ‘fair cross-section’ requirement.  
This lack of doctrinal clarity has led lower courts to largely conflate the scope of the Sixth 
Amendment’s ‘fair cross-section’ requirement with that of the Equal Protection Clause, reducing its 
value in ensuring more representative juries. 
This Article proposes an alternate construction of the Sixth Amendment’s ‘fair cross-section’ 
requirement, grounding the jurisprudence in the Sixth Amendment’s vicinage clause.  Such 
textual re-framing would be more faithful to the Framers’ understanding of representativeness.  It 
would also resolve the doctrinal conflict and the jurisprudential paradox now constraining the 
‘fair cross-section’ requirement and would revitalize the Sixth Amendment by precluding the 
categorical exclusions from jury service that are prevalent in many jurisdictions across the country. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Sixth Amendment was framed in an atmosphere of intense 
mistrust of a potentially tyrannical government,1 and each procedural 
right enshrined in the Sixth Amendment was seen as a critical safe-
guard of individual liberty.  In this regard, perhaps none was more so 
than the right to a jury trial, interposing lay persons as necessary in-
termediaries in the state’s exercise of its sovereign powers.2 
While the fundamental right to a jury trial now is commonly un-
derstood to include a jury of one’s peers, for much of the past two 
centuries large segments of the society were systematically precluded 
from serving on juries.  Even after the Supreme Court rejected the 
categorical exclusions of women and African Americans as being con-
trary to equal protection principles, these segments of society contin-
ued to be significantly underrepresented on juries.  Indeed, through 
 
 1 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1140 (1991) 
(describing the fear of Anti-Federalists that the government would be controlled by the 
aristocracy and would rule through corruption and force); Erik G. Luna, The Models of 
Criminal Procedure, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 389, 398 (1999) (“[A]ll criminal procedure rights 
share a common purpose—limiting the means by which government can investigate, 
prosecute, and punish crime.”); George C. Thomas III, When Constitutional Worlds Collide:  
Resurrecting the Framers’ Bill of Rights and Criminal Procedure, 100 MICH. L. REV. 145, 157 
(2001) (“Fear of a powerful central government led the drafters to give the new govern-
ment specific powers, with the idea that all other powers and functions remained with the 
States.”). 
 2 See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 31 (1965) (“The [jury trial] clause was clearly in-
tended to protect the accused from oppression by the Government . . . .” (citation omit-
ted)); see also Amar, supra note 1, at 1183 (“Spanning both civil and criminal proceedings, 
the key role of the jury was to protect ordinary individuals against governmental over-
reaching.”); id. at 1185 (“[T]he criminal petit jury could interpose itself on behalf of ‘the 
people’s’ rights by refusing to convict when the executive sought to trump up charges 
against its political critics.”); id. at 1186 (“Just as state legislators could protect their con-
stituents against central oppression, so too jurors could obviously ‘interpose’ themselves 
against central tyranny . . . .”). 
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much of the twentieth century it was not uncommon to have defen-
dants tried before juries that did not have a single woman or minority 
juror. 
In response to the persistent under-representation of women, 
African Americans and other minorities on juries, the Supreme 
Court, in a series of celebrated decisions during the early years of the 
Burger Court, held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in-
cluded the right to have the jury selected from a ‘fair cross-section’ of 
society.3  In light of the Equal Protection Clause’s limitations, this 
‘fair cross-section’ requirement held much promise as a means of en-
suring more representative juries. 
Yet, less than four decades later, the ‘fair cross-section’ require-
ment has largely come to a jurisprudential standstill.  Scholars have 
traced the stagnation of the once-promising jurisprudence in part to 
a doctrinal conflict created by the Court’s construction of the ‘fair 
cross-section’ requirement and a paradox resulting from the Court’s 
later limitation of the ‘fair cross-section’ requirement.  Indeed, this 
lack of doctrinal clarity has led lower courts to largely conflate the 
scope of Sixth Amendment’s ‘fair cross-section’ requirement with 
that of the Equal Protection Clause.4 
This Article proposes an alternate construction of the ‘fair cross-
section’ requirement, grounding the jurisprudence in the Sixth 
Amendment’s vicinage clause.  Such textual re-framing would not on-
ly resolve the doctrinal conflict and the jurisprudential paradox now 
constraining the ‘fair cross-section’ requirement, but it would also re-
vitalize the Sixth Amendment by precluding other categorical exclu-
sions from jury service that are prevalent in jurisdictions across the 
country. 
In Part I, the Article sets forth a critical analysis of the Court’s ‘fair 
cross-section’ requirement, tracing the jurisprudence’s development 
and highlighting its limitations.  In Part II, this Article discusses the 
vicinage clause of the Sixth Amendment and its capacity to resolve 
the doctrinal problems created by the Court’s current construction of 
the ‘fair cross-section’ requirement.  Within the context of this dis-
cussion, the Article demonstrates how such a textual re-framing 
would best reflect the Framers’ understanding of representativeness.  
Finally, in Part III, the Article examines the implications of the tex-
tual re-framing of the ‘fair cross-section’ requirement, including its 
 
 3 See infra Part I.B. 
 4 See infra Part I.C. 
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impact on state practices that continue to categorically exclude cer-
tain sections of the community from serving on juries. 
I.  THE SUPREME COURT’S ‘FAIR CROSS-SECTION’ JURISPRUDENCE 
For much of the past two centuries, large segments of the society 
were systematically precluded from serving on juries.  As discussed in 
Part I.A., this exclusion continued largely unabated despite the 
Court’s repeated admonitions, beginning in 1880, that race-based ex-
clusions contravened the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause.  It was in the context of the limitation of the equal protection 
jurisprudence that the Court articulated an independent constitu-
tional basis for addressing continuing systemic under-representation 
of large segments of the community on juries.  As discussed in Part 
I.B., the Court interpreted the Sixth Amendment’s right to an impar-
tial jury as requiring that the venire from which the jury is selected 
represent a ‘fair cross-section’ of the community. 
The Court’s ‘fair cross-section’ jurisprudence, however, has prov-
en problematic.  As discussed in Part I.C., the Court’s current ap-
proach has been paradoxical in terms of its inapplicability to the 
seated jury, has conflicted with the Court’s jurisprudence regarding 
non-discrimination in the exercise of peremptory strikes, and has en-
tangled the Sixth Amendment with the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause.  Given the lack of doctrinal clarity, it is not 
surprising that the ‘fair cross-section’ requirement has largely stag-
nated over the years. 
A.  The Systematic Exclusion of Minorities from Jury Service 
 During the common law, women were barred from juries, a dis-
criminatory practice traced in part back to “Blackstone’s pro-
nouncement that women were ineligible for jury service due to propter 
defectum sexus, a ‘defect of sex.’”5  The exclusion of women continued 
in the various states after the Founding and was expanded to include 
 
 5 See Martha Craig Daughtrey, Women and the Constitution:  Where We Are at the End of the Cen-
tury, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 16 (2000) (discussing the history of women’s jury service in 
America (citing LINDA K. KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES (1998))); 
Charlan Nemeth, Jeffrey Endicott & Joel Wachtler, From the ’50s to the ’70s:  Women in Jury 
Deliberations, 39 SOCIOMETRY 293, 293–94 (1976) (describing that the “tendency to ques-
tion the female’s intellectual capabilities for jury service dates at least to the 18th century, 
when Blackstone maintained that women were excluded ‘propter defectum sexus’”). 
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slaves.6  Nor was the exclusion of African Americans limited to 
slaves—during the “antebellum period, blacks were excluded from 
jury service in all southern and most northern states.”7  Exclusion 
from jury service was also prevalent in the Midwest and West.  African 
Americans residing in Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, and Oregon in the 
1850s, for example, were barred from serving on juries.8 
While some African Americans apparently were permitted to serve 
on juries just prior to the Civil War,9 for the most part the systematic 
exclusion of African Americans continued through the years imme-
diately following the Civil War.  Many southern states continued to 
bar black jury service by statute during the period between 1865 and 
186610 and “[m]any northern Republicans in 1866 continued to resist 
the extension to blacks of . . . equal political rights, such as . . . jury 
service.”11 
The ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 did not 
directly change this discriminatory exclusion from jury service, per-
haps because it was not seen at the time as applying to jury service.12  
As such, for almost a century after the Founding, the community 
judgment reflected in a jury’s verdict was one in which the voices of 
women and African Americans had been silenced. 
The years after the Civil War witnessed the first opportunities for 
women to serve on juries.  In a development that drew international 
attention, women were briefly permitted to serve on juries in the 
Wyoming Territory beginning in 1870.13  Women served on juries in 
 
 6 See Nemeth, Endicott & Wachtler, supra note 5, at 293 (“The States, however, added 
another category of their own for exclusion—the slaves.”). 
 7 Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 303, 370 (1998). 
 8 See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory:  A Response to Professor 
McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1889 (1995) (describing hostility towards blacks in the 
Midwest during the 1850s). 
 9 See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United 
States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 884–85 (1994) (discussing jury service by two African Amer-
icans in Massachusetts in 1860). 
 10 See Klarman, supra note 7, at 370–71 (noting that many states continued to bar black jury 
service during the antebellum period). 
 11 Id. at 325. 
 12 See Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 
213, 238 (1991) (“It is unclear whether the Reconstruction amendments’ drafters in-
tended to prohibit racial discrimination in jury service, as they plainly did with regard to 
property ownership and voting . . . .”). 
 13 See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice and Juror, 20 GA. L. REV. 257, 263 (1986) (explaining 
that “women’s admission to jury duty came after a long struggle”); see also Alschuler & 
Deiss, supra note 9, at 898 (“The first jury service by women in America . . . occurred in 
the Wyoming Territory in 1870.”). 
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Washington Territory in 1884 and in Utah beginning in 1898.14  
These instances of women serving on juries, however, were the excep-
tion rather than the rule, with the systematic exclusion of women 
from juries continuing across the country for many more decades.15 
This same period following the Civil War also witnessed increased 
opportunities for African Americans to serve on juries.  Although the 
first decade of Reconstruction did not see meaningful changes in the 
discriminatory exclusion of African Americans from jury service,16 it 
did witness “extraordinary changes in American racial attitudes and 
practices.  Slavery was abolished. . . . The Reconstruction Act of 1867 
and the Fifteenth Amendment enfranchised blacks for the first time 
in most of the nation. . . . In the South, blacks turned out to vote in 
extraordinary numbers, returning hundreds of black officeholders.”17 
With the passage of the 1875 Civil Rights Act18 prohibiting race-
based discrimination in jury service, things began to change.19  En-
franchised African Americans “used their political power to secure 
both state and federal statutes forbidding race-based exclusions from 
jury service.”20  Moreover, “Republican attitudes toward black jury ser-
vice changed over the course of Reconstruction.”21 
As a result, southern blacks served on juries in large numbers well 
into the 1880s, especially in counties with substantial black popula-
tions.22  And while African Americans continued to be barred from 
jury service in former slave states where the African American popula-
 
 14 See Abrahamson, supra note 13, at 263–64 (explaining that “Washington Territory had 
women jurors during 1884” and that “in 1898 Utah became the first state to permit wom-
en to serve on juries”). 
 15 In the Wyoming Territory, for example, women were once again barred from jury service 
in 1871.  See id. at 263 (“For a short time, from March 1870 to September 1871, the Terri-
tory of Wyoming provided that women could serve on juries.”). 
 16 This is not to say that no African Americans served on juries during the first decade of 
Reconstruction.  On the contrary, African Americans, for example, began to serve on ju-
ries in South Carolina in 1867.  See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 9, at 886 (stating that 
“[d]uring Reconstruction, African-Americans in some jurisdictions regularly served on ju-
ries”). 
 17 Klarman, supra note 7, at 307.  Moreover, “Republican attitudes toward black jury service 
changed over the course of Reconstruction.”  Id. at 372. 
 18 Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (“That no citizen possessing all other qualifica-
tions which are or may be prescribed by law shall be disqualified for service as a grand or 
petit juror in any court of the United States, or of any State, on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude . . . .”). 
 19 See Klarman, supra note 12, at 238 (“[I]t was the 1875 Civil Rights Act . . . that authorized 
judicial invalidation of racial jury exclusions.”). 
 20 Klarman, supra note 7, at 371. 
 21 Id. at 372. 
 22 See id. at 371 (recognizing that in southern counties with high black populations, many 
blacks served on juries). 
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tion was not large enough to produce Republican state control—
Maryland, Kentucky, West Virginia—the discriminatory practices 
ended there, too, after the trilogy of decisions by the Supreme Court 
in 1880 confirming the validity of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, “as well 
as the broader constitutional imperative of race neutrality in jury se-
lection.”23 
The end of Reconstruction and the ensuing disfranchisement of 
African Americans in the South,24 however, “facilitated the exclusion 
of blacks from juries.”25  “Black jury service, conceived to be a form of 
political officeholding, was even more anathema to most southern 
whites than was black voting . . . [and] blacks became noticeably less 
present on southern juries by the late 1880s and generally disap-
peared in the 1890s.”26  This exclusion of African Americans from jury 
service in the South continued through the first three decades of the 
twentieth century.27 
Women, likewise, continued to be largely excluded from jury ser-
vice through the first three decades of the twentieth century.  While 
women gained the right to serve on juries in several states after the 
 
 23 See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991) (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 
303, 310 (1880)); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880)); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 
321 (1880); see also Klarman, supra note 7, at 370–71 (discussing how “state law continued 
to bar black jury service until the Supreme Court intervened in 1880”). 
 24 “While a southern black had sat in every U.S. House of Representatives but one between 
1869 and 1901, not another would be elected from 1901 until 1972.  Blacks sat in signifi-
cant numbers in southern state legislatures through the 1880s, but none was elected to 
the Virginia legislature after 1891, the Mississippi legislature after 1895, or the South 
Carolina legislature after 1902.”  Klarman, supra note 7, at 374. 
 25 Id. at 358.  “By the late 1880s southern race relations had commenced a long downward 
spiral. The annual number of black lynchings rose dramatically, peaking early in the 
1890s. . . . Blacks largely had disappeared from southern juries by around 1890 . . . .”  Id. 
at 309. 
 26 Id. at 371.   
“Booker T. Washington observed at the end of the nineteenth century, ‘In 
the whole of Georgia & Alabama, and other Southern states not a negro ju-
ror is allowed to sit in the jury box in state courts.’  A 1910 study found that 
African-Americans rarely served on juries in Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Missouri, South Carolina, and Virginia—and that they never served in Ala-
bama and Georgia.” 
  Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 9, at 894–95. 
 27 See Klarman, supra note 7, at 371, 407 (“Through the first three decades of the twentieth 
century, essentially no blacks sat on southern juries.”); see also Kim Taylor-Thompson, 
Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1261, 1280 (2000) (“At the end of the 
nineteenth century, systematic exclusion of African Americans was still commonplace, 
particularly in the South.  Indeed, through the first half of the twentieth century, state 
courts used systems such as color-coding of tickets placed in the jury selection box in or-
der to separate white jurors from jurors of color.”). 
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ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920, the majority of 
states still barred women from jury service.28 
This systematic exclusion of African Americans and women con-
tinued largely unabated for decades notwithstanding the Supreme 
Court’s recognition, beginning with the trilogy of decisions in 1880,29 
that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited such exclusions on the 
grounds of race.  This can be traced in no small part to the Court’s 
equal protection jurisprudence itself.  While the Supreme Court 
“heard about ten cases in which southern black defendants sought to 
overturn their criminal convictions on the ground that members of 
their race had been systematically excluded from jury service,”30 in re-
jecting nearly all these challenges,31 the Court “impos[ed] stringent 
standards of proof on defendants alleging race discrimination in jury 
selection and announc[ed] a broad rule of deference to state court 
findings on the question of discrimination.”32 
These restrictions permitted  
[s]outhern states [to] easily evade[] the Strauder right through the frau-
dulent exercise of administrative discretion in the selection of jurors.  By 
refusing to presume unconstitutional motivation on the part of state ad-
ministrative officials, to infer discriminatory motive from disparate im-
pact, or to closely scrutinize state court findings of fact, the Court effec-
tively invited nullification of the right.33   
So while the Court repeatedly reaffirmed that systematic exclusions 
from jury service on the grounds of race violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, it “largely nullified Strauder by making such discrimina-
tion virtually impossible to prove.”34 
The inefficacy of the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence was 
demonstrated by its decision in Hoyt v. Florida.35  The Court was faced 
with a Florida statute that automatically exempted women from jury 
service, allowing women to serve on juries only if they called in to the 
clerk’s office and indicated their desire to be placed on the jury list.36  
 
 28 See Abrahamson, supra note 13, at 264 (explaining that upon ratification of the Nine-
teenth Amendment, women became eligible to serve on juries in several states but not in 
most). 
 29 The trilogy of decisions included Strauder v. Virginia. 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
 30 Klarman, supra note 7, at 304. 
 31 The Court granted relief “[o]nly on the rare occasions when state officials admitted the 
deliberate exclusion of blacks from juries or when state courts refused black defendants 
the opportunity to present evidence of race discrimination in jury selection.”  Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 407. 
 34 Id. at 376. 
 35 368 U.S. 57 (1961). 
 36 See id. at 58 (discussing a Florida statute which actively required women to register as po-
tential jurors). 
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In holding that the state’s opt-in statute was constitutional, the Court 
found that it was reasonable for the state to enact different legislation 
for women because they are “still regarded as the center of home and 
family life.”37 
B.  Development of the ‘Fair Cross-Section’ Requirement 
The Sixth Amendment, proposed by James Madison in 1789 and 
ratified in 1791,38 mandates that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a . . . trial[] by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law.”39  Yet, 
despite the broad reach of the right to jury trial, for over a century af-
ter the Sixth Amendment’s ratification the Supreme Court did not 
issue a single opinion concerning this right.40 
The dearth of decisions during this period is not surprising.  Since 
most crimes were prosecuted by states to whom the Bill of Rights did 
not apply at the time,41 and since there was a significant limitation on 
a defendant’s ability to challenge a federal conviction,42 there was lit-
tle occasion for the Court to interpret the Sixth Amendment right to 
a jury trial.  This was true even during the Reconstruction Era despite 
 
 37 Id. at 61–62. 
 38 See Penny J. White, “He Said,” “She Said,” and Issues of Life and Death:  The Right to Confronta-
tion at Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 387, 397 n.46 (2007) (describ-
ing the history of the Sixth Amendment and the development of its language). 
 39 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 40 See Jonathan F. Mitchell, Apprendi’s Domain, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 297, 342 (2006) 
(“[T]here was very little case law interpreting the Sixth Amendment in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries . . . .”). 
 41 See Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Balt., 32 U.S. 243, 250–51 (1833) (holding that the 
Fifth Amendment only limits the federal government and is not applicable to state gov-
ernments).  There were also significant procedural hurdles preventing state court defen-
dants from using collateral proceedings to appeal to the Supreme Court.  See Paul M. Ba-
tor, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 
441, 465 (1963) (“[U]ntil 1867 (and with exceptions not relevant here) there was no fed-
eral habeas jurisdiction to inquire into detentions pursuant to state law.  Further, even af-
ter the act of 1867 established such a jurisdiction, the Supreme Court could make no 
pronouncements in cases of state detention because the Court’s appellate jurisdiction 
under the act of 1867 was removed in 1868 and not reestablished until 1885.  Thus dur-
ing the first century of the Constitution the Court had no occasion to deal with the scope 
of the habeas jurisdiction for state prisoners.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 42 See Bator, supra note 41, at 473 n.75 (“Until 1889 federal criminal cases were reviewable 
by the Supreme Court only when there was a division of opinion in the circuit court on a 
question of law.” (citations omitted)). 
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the enactment of a statute geared at expanding state defendants’ 
access to federal courts.43 
It was in the post-Reconstruction Era that the Court first dealt with 
the right to a jury trial.  Interestingly, in contrast to the broad 
mandate of the Sixth Amendment that defendants in “all” criminal 
prosecutions be provided the right to a jury trial, the Court’s first fo-
ray in this area involved a restrictive reading of the right.  In a series 
of decisions towards the end of the nineteenth century, the Court 
circumscribed the scope of the right to a jury trial, finding that the 
right did not extend to the trial of petty crimes.44 
The Court’s restrictive approach to the scope of the right to a jury 
trial continued over the next century.  For instance, when the Court 
incorporated the right to a jury trial, it held that the right applied on-
ly to trials of non-petty crimes.45  And while the Court subsequently 
read the right to a jury trial to include criminal contempt proceed-
ings, it excluded “petty” contempt proceedings46 and contempt pro-
 
 43 See id. at 478–83 (discussing the early cases involving habeas corpus jurisdiction for state 
prisoners); Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331, 2337–38 
(1993) (“[O]ne of the most significant enactments of the Reconstruction era, the Habeas 
Corpus Act of 1867, extended that jurisdiction to cases in which petitioners charged they 
were unlawfully detained by state officials . . . . In the wake of Reconstruction, habeas 
helped shape the relations between the federal government and the states.” (footnotes 
omitted)); id. at 2339–40 (“Still, as late as the notorious Leo Frank case, Frank v. Mangum, 
the Court repeated the confused boilerplate that had attached itself to the writ over the 
preceding century . . . [and] federal habeas was open only if the state court had exceeded 
its jurisdiction—if it had ceased to act as a court.”). 
 44 See generally District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937) (stating that only major 
offenses are entitled to a jury trial); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904) (noting 
that there is no constitutional right to a jury for the trial of a petty offense); Natal v. Loui-
siana, 139 U.S. 621 (1891) (holding that petty offenses may be punished without trial by 
jury); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888) (finding that the right to a trial by jury does 
not extend to all classes of misdemeanors). 
 45 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968) (“[W]e hold no constitutional doubts 
about the practices common in both federal and state courts, of accepting waivers of jury 
trial and prosecuting petty crimes without extending a right to jury trial.” (footnote omit-
ted)).  The Burger and Rehnquist Courts reaffirmed this reading of the right to jury trial.  
See Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 545 (1989) (holding that any offense, 
even one deemed “serious” like a DUI, is still “petty” if the authorized maximum sentence 
is six months or less); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) (holding that no of-
fense can be labeled “petty” if more than a six-month sentence is authorized).  While the 
Supreme Court has not expressly incorporated the vicinage clause, its incorporation is 
implicit in these cases.  Moreover, even if one were to argue that the vicinage clause has 
heretofore not been incorporated, its central role in the adoption of the Sixth Amend-
ment, see infra Section II, would require its incorporation.  
 46 See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 210 (1968) (“[T]he guarantees of jury trial found in 
Article III and the Sixth Amendment do not apply to petty offenses.”); see also Frank v. 
United States, 395 U.S. 147, 149–50 (1969) (holding that there is no right to a jury trial 
for criminal contempt proceedings where the actual sentence imposed was less than six 
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ceedings where the sentences imposed were subsequently reduced to 
the equivalent of a single term of six months.47  The Court also found 
that the right did not apply to probation revocation hearings48 or ju-
venile court proceedings.49 
The Court’s restrictive reading of the scope of the right to a jury 
trial mirrored its restrictive reading of the size and function of the 
jury.  In particular, despite the long-standing understanding that the 
right to a jury trial meant the right to a unanimous jury verdict,50 the 
Court held that this unanimity requirement was not applicable to 
state prosecutions.51  Similarly, the Court held that while a twelve-
person jury was required in federal prosecutions, juries in state pros-
ecutions could be composed of fewer than twelve persons.52 
In contrast to these restrictive decisions concerning the scope, 
size, and function of juries, the Court has been comparatively more 
zealous in ensuring the proper composition of juries.  The Court not 
only has mandated race-based questions in some criminal cases and 
prohibited discrimination in the exercise of peremptory strikes dur-
ing jury selection, but, as discussed below, the Court has also required 
that the venire from which the jury is selected represent a ‘fair cross-
section’ of the community. 
 
months).  The Court’s extension of the right to jury trial to criminal contempt proceed-
ings, while constituting an expansive reading of the right to a jury trial, undermined civil 
rights advancements by providing that these cases be tried before juries that would not 
convict whites instead of allowing convictions by judges.  See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, 
Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 137 (1994) (recognizing that 
southern white juries tended to acquit whites). 
 47 See Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1974) (“Although petitioner was ultimately 
found guilty and sentenced separately on eight counts of contempt, the sentences were to 
run concurrently and were . . . equivalent to a single sentence of six months.  The eight 
contempts . . . thus constituted petty offenses, and trial by jury was not required.”). 
 48 Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 n.7 (1984). 
 49 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971). 
 50 See Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748 (1948) (“Unanimity in jury verdicts is re-
quired where the Sixth . . . Amendment  appl[ies].”). 
 51 Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410–11 (1972). 
 52 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86–103 (1970).  In a series of subsequent decisions, the 
Court set forth the Due Process limitations on jury size and unanimity in state prosecu-
tions.  In particular, the Court subsequently held that juries in state courts must be com-
prised of a minimum of six persons.  See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978), and that 
non-unanimous verdicts in state prosecutions would be unconstitutional if they were the 
product of six-person juries, see Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 134–39 (1979) (holding 
that a conviction by a non-unanimous six-person jury in a state criminal trial for a non-
petty offense violates the right of an accused to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments).  Therefore, while both 9-3 and 5-1 jury verdicts are unconsti-
tutional in federal prosecutions, only the latter are unconstitutional in state prosecutions. 
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In the 1940s, the Court began to focus on the representativeness 
of juries.53  While analyzing the petitioner’s challenge in Smith v. Texas 
under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court held that “juries as in-
struments of public justice . . . [should] be a body truly representative 
of the community.”54 
Two years after this “true landmark case in the advancement of 
the fair cross-section requirement,”55 the Court grounded the notion 
of representativeness in the Sixth Amendment and used the phrase 
“cross section” for the first time in Glasser v. United States.56  In Glasser, 
the Court held that jury commissioners responsible for picking the 
venire could not use their discretion in a way that did not “comport 
with the concept of the jury as a cross-section of the community.”57  
Sowing the seeds for the future entanglement of the Jury Trial 
Clause, the Court held that a ‘fair cross-section’ was necessary to en-
sure an impartial jury.58  Although finding that the defendant had 
failed to prove his case, the Court held “that those responsible for 
compiling federal jury lists could not limit their search to discrete 
groups.”59 
In the following years, the Court used its supervisory power to 
strike down two methods for assembling venires.  In Thiel v. Southern 
Pacific Co., the Court reversed a defense verdict in a civil action where 
the jury commissioner and court clerk excluded daily wage earners 
from the venire.60  The Thiel Court employed the “cross section” lan-
guage from Glasser, finding that excluding wage earners from the po-
tential jury would “breathe life into any latent tendencies to establish 
the jury as the instrument of the economically and socially privi-
leged.”61 
The Court also employed its supervisory power to overturn a crim-
inal conviction in the case of Ballard v. United States, where women 
 
 53 See generally Martha Craig Daughtrey, Cross Sectionalism in Jury-Selection Procedures After Tay-
lor v. Louisiana, 43 TENN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1975) (discussing the history of the Supreme 
Court’s review of jury-selection cases). 
 54 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940). 
 55 Robert C. Walters, Michael D. Marin & Mark Curriden, Jury of Our Peers:  An Unfulfilled 
Constitutional Promise, 58 SMU L. REV. 319, 335 (2005). 
 56 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942). 
 57 Id. 
 58 See id. (explaining that a jury representative of the community is required for the jury sys-
tem to function properly).  
 59 Andrew D. Leipold, Constitutionalizing Jury Selection in Criminal Cases:  A Critical Evaluation, 
86 GEO L.J. 945, 952–53 (1998) (citing Glasser, 315 U.S. at 86). 
 60 See Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 221, 225 (1946). 
 61 Id. at 224. 
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were systematically excluded from the jury pool.62  Equally important 
to the decision to strike down the challenged system was the language 
Justice Douglas used in his majority opinion: 
The truth is that the two sexes are not fungible; a community made up 
exclusively of one is different from a community composed of both; the 
subtle interplay of influence one on the other is among the imponde-
rables.  To insulate the courtroom from either may not in a given case 
make an iota of difference.  Yet a flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either 
sex is excluded.  The exclusion of one may indeed make the jury less rep-
resentative of the community than would be true if an economic or racial 
group were excluded.63 
Glasser, Thiel, and Ballard established several important principles.  
First, the Court in Glasser found that representative juries were not 
only essential to promote representative government, but they also 
were linked with a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right.64  Second, 
these opinions embraced both the concept of inclusion and nondi-
scrimination.65  The concern for inclusion recognizes that “those eli-
gible for jury service are to be found in every stratum of society”66 and 
that “competence is an individual rather than a group or class mat-
ter.”67  Third, these decisions, at least implicitly, emobodied the no-
tion that certain groups may influence the outcome of a trial, and 
that representativeness, therefore, is necessary to ensure an impartial 
jury.68 
These developments laid the groundwork for Taylor v. Louisiana, 
where the Court used the cross-section language of the Sixth 
Amendment to strike down Louisiana’s method for choosing a ve-
nire.69  Less than fifteen years after it had rejected Equal Protection 
challenges to a similar statute,70 the Court confronted a Louisiana sta-
tute that automatically excluded women from being summoned for 
 
 62 Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195–96 (1946) (stating that excluding women from 
jury panels may be highly prejudicial). 
 63 Id. at 193–94. 
 64 See Mitchell S. Zuklie, Comment, Rethinking the Fair Cross-Section Requirement, 84 CAL. L. 
REV. 101, 108 (1996) (recognizing that the Sixth Amendment required representative ju-
ries (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 85 (1942))). 
 65 See Leipold, supra note 59, at 954 (discussing the Court’s use of non-discriminatory, inclu-
sive language in Ballard, Glasser, and Thiel). 
 66 Id. (quoting Thiel, 328 U.S. at 220).  
 67 Id. (quoting Thiel, 328 U.S. at 220). 
 68 See id. at 955 (“Far more than in some later cases, the Court felt free to acknowledge the 
risks and probability that some group members—by nature of their gender or economic 
class—would be biased in favor of or prejudiced against certain defendants.”). 
 69 See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531 (1975) (“We are also persuaded that the fair 
cross-section requirement is violated . . . here . . . .”). 
 70 See supra text accompanying notes 35–37 (discussing Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961)). 
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jury service unless they filed a declaration of their desire to serve; 
men, on the other hand, did not have to go through a similar proce-
dure.71  As a result of Louisiana’s “opt-in” system, only 10% of the 
53% of otherwise eligible women were called to serve at the defen-
dant’s trial.72  Writing for the majority, Justice White phrased the issue 
as being one about “whether the presence of a ‘fair cross-section’ of 
the community on venires, panels, or lists from which petit juries are 
drawn is essential to the fulfillment of the Sixth Amendment’s guar-
antee of an impartial jury in criminal prosecutions.”73 
Eight members of the Court agreed that “the selection of a petit 
jury from a representative cross-section of the community is an essen-
tial component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.”74  The 
Court found that the purposes of the jury were lost by a process that 
failed to comport with the cross-section requirement:  (1) to “guard 
against the exercise of arbitrary power;” (2) to preserve “public con-
fidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system;”75 and (3) to 
uphold that the ideal that “sharing in the administration of justice is 
a phase of civic responsibility.”76  The Court also relied on the lan-
guage in Ballard, where Justice Douglas had stated that “a flavor, a 
distinct quality is lost if either sex is excluded.”77 
Four years after Taylor v. Louisiana, the Court struck a state “opt-
out” system for selection of the jury venire in Duren v. Missouri.78  In 
contrast to Louisiana’s statute that had automatically exempted wom-
en unless they opted-in to jury service, the Missouri statute included 
all women in jury service pools, but allowed any woman who sought 
to do so, the right to automatically be exempted from jury service.  In 
rejecting this “opt-out” scheme, the Court in Duren enunciated the 
test for establishing a ‘fair cross-section’ violation.  First, the defen-
dant must first make a prima facie case, demonstrating three facts:  
(1) the alleged exclusion affects a “distinctive group;” (2) the number 
of members from the group is unreasonable in proportion to the 
number in the community; and (3) the underrepresentation is the 
result of “systematic exclusion.”79  Unlike the equal protection test, 
 
 71 See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 531. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 526 (emphasis added). 
 74 Id. at 528. 
 75 Id. at 530. 
 76 Id. at 531 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 
(1946)). 
 77 Id. at 532 (quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193–94 (1946)). 
 78 439 U.S. 357 (1979). 
 79 Id. at 364. 
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the defendant need not show that the under-representation was the 
result of purposeful discrimination.  Second, if the defendant suc-
cessfully makes out a prima facie case, then the state must show that 
the exclusion serves a “significant state interest.”80 
Thus, after almost two centuries of continuing under-
representation of women, African Americans and other minorities on 
juries, and less than fifteen years after the Court had rejected equal 
protection challenges to state opt-in statutes, the Burger Court identi-
fied a new jurisprudential basis for ensuring that juries did indeed 
function as voices of the whole community.  No longer restricted by 
the demanding burdens of equal protection analysis, the Court’s ‘fair 
cross-section’ jurisprudence held much hope for ending the systemat-
ic exclusion of women, African Americans, and other minorities from 
jury service. 
C.  Limitations of the Court’s ‘Fair Cross-Section’ Jurisprudence 
The Court’s ‘fair cross-section’ jurisprudence has since failed to 
live up to its promise.  In part this has been due to the Court’s cur-
tailment of the scope of this jurisprudence, the creation of a doctrin-
al paradox, and the lower courts’ conflation of it with the Court’s 
equal protection jurisprudence.  As discussed below, these develop-
ments have led, not surprisingly, to a largely inefficacious jurispru-
dence. 
Consider first the Court’s curtailment of the scope of the ‘fair 
cross-section’ requirement.  As discussed above, the ‘fair cross-
section’ grew out of the historical failure of the Court to prevent the 
systematic under-representation of women, African Americans, and 
other minorities on juries.  One might have expected, therefore, that 
the ‘fair cross-section’ jurisprudence would apply to under-
representation on the seated jury—whether the petit jury or the 
grand jury.  Instead, the Rehnquist Court subsequently held that this 
‘fair cross-section’ requirement is limited to the venire from which 
the jury is selected; it does not extend to the actual seated jury.81  The 
fallacy of this approach is revealed by the fact that it calls into ques-
tion the textual basis for the ‘fair cross-section’ jurisprudence:  After 
 
 80 Id. at 367.  After the writing of this article, the United States Supreme Court decided 
Berghuis v. Smith, 130 S.Ct. 1382 (2010), reversing the lower court’s decision granting re-
lief to a defendant on a ‘fair cross-section’ claim.  In deeming reasonable the Michigan 
Supreme Court’s determination that the defendant had failed to establish a prima facie 
violation of the Sixth Amendment ‘fair cross-section’ requirement, the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed its approach in Taylor v. Louisiana and Duren v. Missouri.  See id. at 387–88. 
 81 See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990). 
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all, the Sixth Amendment gives defendants the right to an “impartial 
jury,” not the right to an “impartial jury venire.” 
Consider next, the doctrinal paradox that has arisen between the 
‘fair cross-section’ jurisprudence and the Court’s jurisprudence re-
garding discrimination in jury selection.  The Court in Taylor had 
grounded the cross-section requirement in the “impartial jury” guar-
antee of the Sixth Amendment, drawing on the notion that “different 
groups of jurors can view exactly the same evidence and reach differ-
ent conclusions, and that these different outcomes are correlated to 
the jurors’ race or gender.”82  In doing so, the Court cited its earlier 
opinion in Ballard for the proposition that “a flavor, a distinct quality 
is lost if either sex is excluded.”83 
The Court’s “flavors” rationale was mocked by Justice Rehnquist 
in dissent.  He characterized the Court’s rationale as “smack[ing] 
more of mysticism than of law.”84  He also argued that whatever merit 
the Court’s rationale had, it was undermined by the Court’s inconsis-
tent application of the rationale by not extending it to the exclusion 
of groups such as lawyers and doctors, groups that might fairly be 
characterized as bringing “distinct flavors” to deliberations. 
The criticisms levied by Justice Rehnquist in dissent in Taylor were 
accentuated by the Court’s later decision in Batson v. Kentucky.85  In a 
case involving the use of peremptory challenges during jury selection, 
the Court affirmed that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the ex-
ercise of such challenges on the basis of race, and eased the showing 
necessary to establish such claims.86  As Professor Muller has noted, 
the Court’s rationale in Batson is fundamentally inconsistent with the 
rationale underlying the ‘fair cross-section’ requirement.87  After all, if 
potential jurors cannot be excluded on the basis of race and gender 
because those characteristics bring distinct “flavors” and perspectives 
 
 82 Leipold, supra note 59, at 964. 
 83 Taylor, 419 U.S. at 532 (citation omitted). 
 84 Id. at 542 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  Justice Rehnquist also argued that the weakness of 
the Court’s rationale was exposed by its apparent limitation of the ‘fair cross-section’ re-
quirement to jury venires and its apparent inapplicability to groups such as lawyers and 
doctors.  Id. 
 85 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).  The Court subsequently held that the ratio-
nale of its decision in Batson extended to peremptory strikes exercised on the basis of 
gender.  See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
 86 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to chal-
lenge potential jurors solely on account of their race . . . .”). 
 87 See Eric L. Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox:  Harmless Error, Jury Representation, and the 
Sixth Amendment, 106 YALE L.J. 93, 93–96 (1996) (critiquing Batson for presenting a reme-
dy for a violation which, though resulting in equal protection harms, does not affect the 
reliability of the verdict). 
May 2011] ‘FAIR CROSS-SECTION’ 947 
 
to deliberations, then why should parties to litigation not be able to 
exclude such distinct perspectives? 
Finally consider the conflation of the ‘fair cross-section’ jurispru-
dence with equal protection principles.  As the Duren opinion lays 
bare, the cross-section test borrowed heavily from the Court’s Equal 
Protection Clause doctrine.  Not surprisingly, over time courts have 
largely conflated the scope of the Cross-Section Clause with the Equal 
Protection Clause.88  Specifically, lower courts have treated the “dis-
tinct group” requirement of the cross-section requirement as identic-
al to the “suspect class” requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment.89  
While this has made the Sixth Amendment a useful tool in combating 
some discrimination,90 conflating “distinctiveness” with “suspect classi-
fication” has led lower courts to find that the following groups are 
not protected by the cross-section requirement:  “[Y]oung people, 
 
 88 Leipold, supra note 59, at 972 (“In fact, the cross-section and equal protection cases sig-
nificantly overlap; groups have successfully challenged selection practices under either or 
both theories.”). 
 89 See Zuklie, supra note 64, at 132 (“A . . . major flaw in the discrimination analysis is that it 
conflates two distinct inquiries:  ‘[D]istinctiveness’ under the Sixth Amendment with 
‘suspectness’ under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (citation 
omitted)); see also Leipold, supra note 59, at 969 (“[C]ourts routinely limit the application 
of the cross-section requirement to groups that already receive heightened protection 
under the Equal Protection Clause.”); Donald H. Zeigler, Young Adults as a Cognizable 
Group in Jury Selection, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1057–61 (1978) (noting the various ways 
lower courts have limited the protection of groups under the cross-section doctrine); 
Zuklie, supra note 64, at 103 (“It appears that courts lack a clear understanding of what 
the distinctiveness test aims to accomplish, and that they have collapsed their analysis of 
group distinctiveness into a single inquiry—whether members of the group are victims of 
general societal discrimination.”). 
 90 See Leipold, supra note 59, at 967 (“[T]oday no state procedure intentionally and syste-
matically excludes women or religious, racial, or ethnic minorities.”).  It bears noting that 
while it appears to be less onerous to prove a violation of the ‘fair cross-section’ require-
ment than an equal protection violation because the former does not require a showing 
of discriminatory intent, Sixth Amendment claims have not been more successful.  See 
John P. Bueker, Jury Source Lists:  Does Supplementation Really Work?, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 
390, 400 (1997) (“In theory, it also makes it easier for a defendant to succeed in challeng-
ing a jury selection system on Sixth Amendment grounds.  In practice, however, Sixth 
Amendment challenges are more common, but not more successful.” (citations omit-
ted)).  In part this is because, while it might be easier to establish a prima facie case that 
the ‘fair cross-section’ right has been violated, it is easier for the state to rebut a Sixth 
Amendment violation than it is for it to rebut an equal protection claim.  To defeat a 
prima facie equal protection claim, the government must show that a “compelling” inter-
est is advanced, but to defeat a prima facie ‘fair cross-section’ claim, the government need 
only show that “‘significant state interest[s are] manifestly and primarily advanced.’”  Lei-
pold, supra note 59, at 974 (quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 367–68 (1979)).  For 
this reason, winning on a ‘fair cross-section’ claim is not necessarily easier than winning 
on an Equal Protection claim.  Id. at 974 (“The point is simply that prevailing on a fair 
cross-section challenge is not obviously or substantially easier than proving an equal pro-
tection claim.” (citation omitted)). 
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old people, poor people, deaf people, less educated people, college 
students, resident aliens, blue-collar workers, professional workers, 
felons, juvenile offenders, those not registered to vote, those opposed 
to the death penalty, those affiliated with the National Rifle Associa-
tion, city residents, and residents of Minneapolis.”91  These groups 
were found to be not distinct because they do not have unique “fla-
vors”—that is, their life experiences are not so unique as to make 
them prone to interpret evidence in a manner that is different from 
how other “distinct” groups might view that evidence.  As a result, be-
cause ‘fair cross-section’ jurisprudence “adds little to the equal pro-
tection commands already in place, the Sixth Amendment innovation 
has withered, while the Batson line continues to grow and thrive.”92 
The circumscribed scope of the ‘fair cross-section’ requirement, 
the doctrinal conflict with the Batson line of cases and the conflation 
with Equal Protection jurisprudence have led to a largely ineffica-
cious jurisprudence.93  Over the three decades since Taylor v. Louisi-
ana, defendants have had little success in federal courts raising Sixth 
Amendment claims that the juries in their cases were selected from 
venires that did not reflect a ‘fair cross-section’ of the community.94  
The same has been true for claims raised in state courts across the 
country.95  The limited efficacy of the ‘fair cross-section’ jurispru-
dence can be traced to its entanglement with the equal protection 
principles in that the “cognizable groups” element of the Sixth 
Amendment analysis has been largely equated by federal courts to the 
suspect and quasi-suspect classifications in equal protection analysis, 
rendering the ‘fair cross-section’ of limited utility in challenging un-
derrepresentation of other classes in society.96  State courts, too, have 
similarly conflated the “cognizable groups” element of the Sixth 
Amendment analysis and the suspect and quasi-suspect classifications 
in equal protection analysis.97  Finally, reflecting the failure of the 
‘fair cross-section’ jurisprudence to meaningfully depart from the 
 
 91 Leipold, supra note 59, at 968–69 (citations omitted); see also Sixth Amendment at Trial, 36 
GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 516, 525 n.1648 (2007) (noting that convicted felons, 
persons charged with felonies, and persons with last names beginning with letters W 
through Z are not cognizable groups). 
 92 Leipold, supra note 59, at 993. 
 93 See id. at 950 (“[I]t lacks a solid intellectual foundation.”); id. at 960 (“Unfortunately, the 
articulated rationale for the [cross-section] doctrine leaves much to be desired.”). 
 94 See Sanjay K. Chhablani, The Failed Legacy of the Fair Cross Section Requirement (on file with 
author) (surveying federal cases where relief for ‘fair cross-section’ claims have been de-
nied). 
 95 See id. (demonstrating the lack of success of ‘fair cross-section’ claims in state court). 
 96 See id.  
 97 See id. 
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onerous showings necessary to establish equal protection violations, 
defendants have rarely prevailed in even those cases where federal 
courts have recognized claims based on non-suspect classifications.98  
Likewise, defendants have rarely prevailed in state courts even where 
those courts have recognized claims based on non-suspect classifica-
tions.99 
II.  THE SIXTH AMENDMENT’S VICINAGE CLAUSE 
The right to a jury trial is a unique constitutional right, proscribed 
by both the unamended Constitution and the Bill of Rights.  Article 
III, Section 2 provides that “the Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of 
Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the 
State where the said crimes shall have been committed.”100  The Sixth 
Amendment, on the other hand, provides that “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a . . . trial[] by an 
impartial jury of the State and district where in the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law.”101  
The critical difference between the two is the latter’s concern about 
vicinage. 
The importance of having the jury be drawn from the geographic 
area in which the crime was committed can be traced back several 
centuries to the time when jury trials were first held.  In those days, 
jurors were asked not just to ascertain facts as presented by the sove-
reign, but to bring their own personal knowledge of the crime and 
the defendant.102  This personal knowledge would have been lacking 
in jurors who did not reside in the geographic locale in which the 
crime was committed and so the right to a jury trial came to be in-
exorably linked to the right to have the jurors drawn from the vici-
nage of the crime.103 
Although drawing jurors from the vicinity of the crime was a long-
standing aspect of the jury in England, it was not a uniform practice 
in the American colonies.  For example, while early New Jersey co-
lonial law did in fact require that the jury be composed of “twelve 
 
 98 See id. 
 99 See id. 
100 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
101 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (emphasis added). 
102 See Drew Kershen, Vicinage, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 801, 813 (1976) [hereinafter Kershen, Vici-
nage I] (noting that jurors were “expected to resolve the disputed questions of fact upon 
the basis of their own knowledge of the crime”). 
103 See id. (“[I]t is obvious that these jurors would then have to be chosen from the vicinity of 
the crime.”). 
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honest men of the neighborhood,” Virginia originally required that 
jurors be chosen from the area surrounding Jamestown, where the 
colonial court was located.104  By the time that the Sixth Amendment 
was debated in 1789, the diversity of state practices was even more 
evident.  While some states, such as Georgia, had a constitutional 
mandate that juries be drawn from the vicinage,105 other states, in-
cluding Connecticut and New York, had no specific vicinage protec-
tions.106 
The unamended Constitution did not include a vicinage provi-
sion, providing in Article III, Section 2 only that the venue of the trial 
be in the state in which the crime occurred.107  This venue provision 
elicited minimal debate during the framing of Article III and was 
meant to address Great Britain’s perceived abuses of the right to a 
jury trial, such as transporting colonial defendants to England to 
stand trial.108  While Article III’s venue provision did not specifically 
address the location from where the jury would be drawn, it did indi-
rectly guarantee that a defendant would be tried by a jury drawn from 
that state.  As such, the vicinage envisioned in this provision was 
broader than the traditional understanding that developed from Eng-
lish common law, with the jury being drawn from a larger geographi-
cal area.  Commentators have observed that the broad language of 
the Article III provision was a result of the fact that this was the most 
precise language that could be agreed upon at the time.109  The states 
retained diverse practices with regard to vicinage, and it was unlikely 
that a more precise provision dealing specifically with vicinage could 
be passed. 
The language in Article III played a significant role in leading to 
the drafting of what eventually became the Sixth Amendment.  Since 
Anti-Federalists feared that Article III did not preserve the common 
 
104 See id. (comparing the jury-selection practices of New Jersey and Virginia).  It was not un-
til 1734 that Virginia adopted a vicinage requirement mandating that jurors be drawn 
from the area of the crime.  Id. 
105 See GA. CONST. art. XXXIX (1777) (“All matters of breach of the peace, felony, murder, 
and treason against the State to be tried in the county where the same was committed.”). 
106 Kershen, Vicinage I, supra note 102, at 814. 
107 See Drew Kershen, Vicinage, 30 OKLA. L. REV.  1, 38 (1977) [hereinafter Kershen, Vicinage 
II] (“[T]he constitutional draftsmen used the place of the commission of the crime as the 
appropriate test to determine . . . venue under Article III . . . .”). 
108 See id., at 808 (“Little debate was engendered by this venue proposal at the Constitutional 
Convention as the delegates undoubtedly recalled the venue grievance listed in the Dec-
laration of Independence.” (citation omitted)). 
109 See Kershen, Vicinage I, supra note 102, at 816 (concluding that the various delegates 
could not agree on more explicit language for the Article III jury provision). 
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law practice of trial by a jury of the vicinage,110 they sought a specific 
vicinage right in the Constitution as a limit on the power of the fed-
eral government. 
On June 8, 1789, James Madison proposed a number of amend-
ments to the Constitution, including one that would eventually be-
come the Sixth Amendment.111  Madison’s proposed language with 
regard to vicinage stated that “[t]he trial of all crimes . . . shall be by 
an impartial jury of freeholders of the vicinage.”112  Additionally, Mad-
ison’s proposal included language allowing for a jury trial away from 
the district where the crime was committed in the case of a general 
insurrection, indicating that he did not view his proposal to be an ab-
solute right to a jury of the vicinage.113  Madison intended his propos-
als to replace Article III’s venue provision directly rather than be in-
cluded as a separate amendment to the Constitution.114  When the 
Committee of Eleven reported on Madison’s proposals on July 28, it 
largely approved Madison’s proposals, including the proposed vici-
nage provision.115 
The House debated the proposals in August of 1789, during 
which time Congressman Burke proposed that the word “vicinage” be 
replaced with the phrase “district or county in which the offence [sic] 
has been committed.”116  Burke’s primary concern was that “vicinage” 
was a vague concept.  However, the proposed amendment failed and 
the word “vicinage” remained in the draft approved for transmission 
to the Senate.117 
The debate in the Senate on the vicinage proposal is especially 
significant.  At the time the Senate began debate on the measure in 
September 1789, the body was dominated by Federalists, and it is 
possible that the Federalist dominance of the Senate in the First 
 
110 See Seth Kreimer, Lines in the Sand:  The Importance of Borders in American Federalism, 150 U. 
PA. L. REV. 973, 977 (2002) (arguing that the Anti-Federalists’ fears ultimately resulted in 
the jury trial provisions of the Sixth Amendment). 
111 See Kershen, Vicinage I, supra note 102, at 818 (detailing Madison’s proposed amendments 
to the Constitution concerning rights at criminal trial). 
112 Id. 
113 See id. (“[I]n all crimes . . . in which a general insurrection may prevail, the trial may by 
law be authorized in some other county of the same State, as near as may be to the seat of 
the offense.”). 
114 See id. at 818–19 (describing Madison’s intentions for how his proposals would be incor-
porated into the Constitution). 
115 See id. at 820 (“[T]he Committee of Eleven presented its report to the House with [Madi-
son’s] two . . . proposals placed in a single proposition . . . .”). 
116 Id. at 821. 
117 Id. 
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Congress affected the outcome of the body’s debate on vicinage.118  
The Senate initially stripped Madison’s vicinage language from what 
would become the Sixth Amendment,119 and later considered a mo-
tion to restore a vicinage proposal to the Bill of Rights.120  The pro-
posed language read in pertinent part that “[t]he trial of all 
crimes . . . shall be by an impartial jury of the vicinage.”121  The mo-
tion failed by a vote of 8–8 largely along factional lines,122 and the Se-
nate returned a version of the Sixth Amendment completely devoid 
of any vicinage provision.123 
 
118 In September of 1789, the Federalists held a 18–8 majority over the Anti-Federalists.  See 
Party Division in the Senate, 1789–Present, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/
history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2011).  The Federal-
ist/Anti-Federalist had become a split between the Pro-Administration and Anti-
Administration factions.  At this time, Rhode Island and North Carolina had not yet rati-
fied the Constitution and therefore had no representation in the Senate.  These states 
would not send representatives to the Senate until June 12, 1790 and November 26, 1789, 
respectively.  See Senators of the United States, 1789–2011, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.
gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/chronlist.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2011). 
119 See Kershen, Vicinage I, supra note 102, at 822 (“Several changes were made . . . by the Se-
nate, among which was the complete elimination of any reference to right to trial by a 
jury of the vicinage.”). 
120 See S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1789) (considering a motion to restore the vici-
nage language). 
121 Id.  
122 See id. (listing how each senator voted on the motion).  Five of the six Anti-Federalist sen-
ators present on September 9 voted for this motion.  They were joined by three members 
generally aligned with the Federalist faction:  Senators Dalton of Massachusetts, Schuyler 
of New York, and Paterson of New Jersey.  The individual practices and concerns in those 
three states may have influenced how these Federalist senators voted on the motion.  
Senator Dalton’s home state of Massachusetts included a strong endorsement of vicinage 
in its state constitution, stating that “[i]n criminal prosecutions, the verification of facts, 
in the vicinity where they happen, is one of the greatest securities of the life, liberty, and 
property of the citizen.”  MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XIII (1780).  Senator Schuyler’s home 
state of New York did not have a specific constitutional provision on vicinage, but vicinage 
was a great enough concern that New York ratified the main body of the Constitution 
with the understanding that a vicinage provision would eventually be included in the Bill 
of Rights.  See Kershen, Vicinage I, supra note 102, at 817 (explaining that New York rati-
fied the Constitution “only after setting forth a declaration which indicated the ratifying 
convention’s understanding of certain constitutional provisions”).  New Jersey also did 
not have specific vicinage support in its constitution, but had a long history of supporting 
strict vicinage.  Its original Fundamental Laws stated “[t]hat no Proprietor, freeholder or 
inhabitant of the said Province of West New Jersey, shall be deprived or condemned of 
life, limb, estate, property or any ways hurt in his or their privileges, freedoms or fran-
chises . . . without a due trial, and judgment passed by twelve good and lawful men of his 
neighborhood.”  THE CHARTER OR FUNDAMENTAL LAWS, OF WEST NEW JERSEY, ch. XVII 
(1677).  . 
123 See Kershen, Vicinage I, supra note 102, at 822 (“Several changes were made . . . by the Se-
nate, among which was the complete elimination of any reference to right to trial by a 
jury of the vicinage.”). 
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There are a number of reasons underlying the Senate’s rejection 
of vicinage language in the Sixth Amendment.  James Madison out-
lined the Senate’s concern with the proposed vicinage clause in a let-
ter dated two weeks after the body rejected restoring such language: 
They are equally inflexible in opposing a definition of the locality of Ju-
ries.  The vicinage they contend is either too vague or strict a term, too 
vague if depending on limits to be fixed by the pleasure of the law, too 
strict if limited to the County.  It was proposed to insert after the word 
Juries, ‘with the accustomed requisites,’ leaving the definition to be con-
strued according to the judgment of professional men.  Even this could 
not be obtained.  The truth is that in most of the States the practice is 
different, and hence the irreconcilable difference of ideas on the subject.  
In some States, jurors are drawn from the whole body of the community 
indiscriminately; in others, from large districts comprehending a number 
of Counties; and in a few only from a single County.  The Senate sup-
posed also that the provision for vicinage in the Judiciary bill, will suffi-
ciently quiet fears which called for an amendment on this point.124 
The role that the diversity of existing state practices played in the vi-
cinage language’s defeat in the Senate appears twofold.  First, Sena-
tors may have been accustomed or partial to the vicinage practices in 
their home states.125  Madison highlighted the difficulties of uniting 
these factions in a letter dated September 14, 1789: 
In many of the States juries even in criminal cases, are taken from the 
State at large; in others from districts of considerable extent; in very few 
 
124 Id. at 822–23 (quoting JAMES MADISON, THE WRITING OF JAMES MADISON 1787–1790 424 
(Gaillard Hunt ed.1904)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
125 While the Senate record concerning the debate over the Sixth Amendment is sparse, 
some information can be gleaned from looking at the Senate composition and individual 
state vicinage practices as of 1789.  There appears to be a correlation between the politi-
cal factions that individual senators belonged to and he strictness of state vicinage prac-
tice.  Those states that had relatively strict vicinage practices had at least one Anti-
Federalist senator.  For example, Virginia, whose constitution provided “[t]hat in all capi-
tal or criminal prosecutions a man hath a right to . . . a speedy trial by an impartial jury of 
twelve men of his vicinage,” VA. CONST. § 8 (1776), was represented by Richard Henry 
Lee and William Grayson.  See Senators of the United States, 1789–2011, U.S. SENATE, http://
www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/chronlist.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 
2011).  On the other hand, states that either had no constitutional vicinage protection or 
had very broad vicinage requirements tended to be represented by Federalists.  For ex-
ample, Connecticut, which featured no specific vicinage protection, sent Oliver Ellsworth 
and William Samuel Johnson, two prominent Federalists, to the Senate.  See id..  While 
Pennsylvania had a vicinage provision in its constitution, which stated “[t]hat in all prose-
cutions for criminal offences, a man hath the right to . . . a speedy public trial, by an im-
partial jury of the country.”  PA. CONST. Declaration of Rights, § IX (1776),  the word 
“country” was later interpreted to “embrace more territory than the neighborhood, the 
visne, or the vicinage.”  State v. Brown, 154 A. 579, 581 (Vt. 1931).  With such a relatively 
broad vicinage provision, it should not be surprising that Pennsylvania was represented by 
two senators generally aligned with the Federalist faction, William Maclay and Robert 
Morris.  See id. 
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from the county alone.  Hence a . . . like to the restraint with respect to 
vicinage, which has produced a negative on the clause. . . . Several others 
have had a similar fate.  The difficulty of uniting the minds of men accus-
tomed to think and act differently can only be conceived by those who 
have witnessed it.126 
In addition to creating political obstacles to a vicinage provision, the 
diversity of state practices in place as of 1789 may have led some sena-
tors to question the appropriateness of including such a provision in 
the Constitution.127  The Senate apparently endorsed the point of 
view prevalent at the Constitutional Convention that “the Constitu-
tion should reflect only fundamental principles upon which general 
agreement existed in the states.”128  Based on this conception of what 
should be included in the Constitution, many Senators felt that the 
diversity of practices in the states rendered vicinage less than funda-
mental.  Some who voted against the Vicinage Clause in the Senate 
apparently did so because states could not agree on the definition of 
vicinage or how it should be practiced.129  Without consensus among 
the states, vicinage was not seen as a fundamental principle appropri-
ate for inclusion in the Bill of Rights. 
The Senate’s belief that the term “vicinage” was too vague was be-
cause the proposed amendment did not delineate a specific geo-
graphic area from which to draw the jury.130  “Vicinage could mean 
several things, including ‘vicinity,’ ‘neighborhood,’ ‘community,’ ‘dis-
trict,’ ‘state,’ or ‘county.’”131  Given the diversity of approaches in the 
states, it is likely the Senate feared inconsistent application of an 
amendment that included the word “vicinage.”132  Senators also 
feared that if the word “vicinage” demanded a precise meaning, the 
general understanding was that it would mean an area no larger than 
 
126 Kershen, Vicinage I, supra note 102, at 823 n.76 (quoting JAMES MADISON, THE WRITING OF 
JAMES MADISON 1787–1790 420 (Gaillard Hunt ed.1904)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
127 See id., at 824 n.77 (establishing that because procedures concerning a jury of the vicinage 
differed between the states, such a provision was rejected by the Senate).  
128 Id. 
129 See id. 
130 See id. at 823 (explaining the Senate’s concerns pertaining to the vagueness of the term 
“vicinage”). 
131 Id. 
132 See id. at 823–24 (“It would appear that the Senate thought the term ‘vicinage,’ used by 
the House, ‘too vague’ because it did not definitely refer to any particular geographical 
territory recognized as a political or governmental unit.”). 
May 2011] ‘FAIR CROSS-SECTION’ 955 
 
a county.133  This was too strict of a requirement for a Federalist-
controlled Senate.134 
After defeat in the Senate, Madison’s vicinage proposal was re-
turned to the House of Representatives, which was unwilling to ac-
cept an amendment without a vicinage clause.135  On September 24, 
1789, the House adopted language that read: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previous-
ly ascertained by law . . . .136 
This language addressed the Senate’s reservations in a number of 
ways.  First, the House version did not contain the word “vicinage,” 
assuaging Senate fears about the potential ambiguity.  Rather, the 
concept of vicinage was tied to a “district,” which was a geographic 
area with definite boundaries that could be defined by the Judiciary 
Act.137  The district could be of any size that Congress decided on in 
passing that Act.  On September 25, the Senate adopted the House 
proposal on vicinage.138 
The definition of “district” was left to the parameters of the Judi-
ciary Act of 1789, which was debated in Congress at the same time 
that the Sixth Amendment debates occurred.139  Section 29 of the Ju-
diciary Act essentially contained three possible definitions of the vici-
nage for federal courts.  First, Section 29 mandated that jurors for 
capital cases should be drawn from the county where the crime was 
committed, unless doing so would cause “great inconvenience.”140  
Second, the Act gave judges broad latitude with regard to vicinage for 
noncapital cases, stating that a federal judge could draw jurors “from 
such parts of the district from time to time as the court shall direct, so 
 
133 See id. at 826 (“At the same time, the Senate had also objected that if the term ‘vicinage’ 
were definite, then it did not refer to a specific geographic area larger than a county.”). 
134 See id. (“[A] county . . . in the opinion of the Senate was too small an area.”). 
135 Id. at 825. 
136 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
137 See id. at 826 (describing how the House met the Senate’s objections to the term “vici-
nage”). 
138 See S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st sess. 88 (1789) (passing “an act to regulate processes in the 
courts”).  There is no detailed record in the Senate Journal of the debate concerning the 
adoption of the vicinage clause.  Additionally, the Senate Journal lacks information on 
how individual senators voted on the measure. 
139 See Kershen, Vicinage I, supra note 102, at 844–45 (detailing the creation of a judicial sys-
tem, as under the Judiciary Act of 1789). 
140 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 29, Stat. 73, 88 (codified as amended in scattered essec-
tions of 28 U.S.C.) (“[I]n cases punishable with death, the trial shall be had in the county 
where the offense was committed, or where that cannot be done without great inconve-
nience, twelve petit jurors at least shall be summoned from thence.”). 
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as shall be most favourable to an impartial trial, and so as not to incur 
an unnecessary expense, or unduly to burthen [sic] the citizens of 
any part of the district with such services.”141  Although jurors had to 
be drawn from the district, the judge had discretion to determine 
what location within the district jurors would be drawn from.142  
Third, the Act allowed a hybrid of the first two vicinage situations for 
capital cases in which “great inconvenience” would occur if jurors 
were only drawn from the county of the crime.  In such a situation, 
the Judiciary Act mandated that twelve jurors be chosen from the 
county of the crime, and the court had discretion to choose the vici-
nage of the rest of the jurors to round out the jury pool.143 
The vicinage clause, thus, played a central role in the adoption of 
the Sixth Amendment.  Defendants in all criminal prosecutions were 
guaranteed not only a trial located in the state in which the crime al-
legedly occurred, but also a trial conducted before a jury drawn from 
the “district” in which the crime was allegedly committed. 
III.  RE-FRAMING THE ‘FAIR CROSS-SECTION’ REQUIREMENT 
 The Sixth Amendment’s vicinage clause provides a compelling al-
ternate textual basis for the ‘fair cross-section’ requirement.  Such re-
framing of the ‘fair cross-section’ requirement would obviate the doc-
trinal paradox created by the Court’s current restriction of the ‘fair 
cross-section’ requirement to jury venires, and resolve the doctrinal 
conflict between the current construction of the ‘fair cross-section’ 
requirement and the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence.  More-
over, such re-framing would be a more textually consistent reading of 
the Sixth Amendment and would be more faithful to the Framers’ 
idea of representativeness embodied in the amendment. 
A.  Grounding the ‘Fair Cross-Section’ Requirement in the Vicinage Clause 
The Sixth Amendment’s vicinage clause provides a textual basis 
for the ‘fair cross-section’ requirement.  A jury venire in which wom-
en, African Americans, or other identifiable groups are substantially 
under-represented would result in a jury that is not drawn from the 
 
141 Id. 
142  Id. ([J]urors . . . shall be returned . . . from such parts of the district from time to time as 
the court shall direct . . . . ”) . 
143 See id. (describing the jury-selection procedure for instances where a “defect of jurors 
shall happen”). 
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“district.”144  Rather, such a jury would be drawn from a smaller, and 
unconstitutionally restrictive, subset of the district.  Only a jury venire 
that represents a ‘fair cross-section’ of the community would lead to a 
jury drawn from the entire pool of potential jurors in the district. 
Such interpretation of the vicinage clause would not happen on a 
blank slate.  In Ruthenberg v. United States, the Court considered a case 
where defendants were convicted in the Northern District of Ohio for 
failing to register with the selective draft.145  In rejecting the defen-
dants’ argument that their Sixth Amendment rights had been vi-
olated because the jury had been drawn from only a portion of the 
Northern District of Ohio, the Court relied on the text of the Judi-
ciary Act of 1789, which it called a contemporary interpretation of 
the Sixth Amendment.146  Section 29 of the Judiciary Act specifically 
allowed for judges to use their discretion in selecting jurors from a 
portion of the district.147 
A decade later, in Lewis v. United States, the Court dealt with a case 
where the defendants were charged with violations of federal banking 
laws that had allegedly occurred in Tulsa, Oklahoma.148  While Tulsa 
had been moved to the Northern District of Oklahoma by the time of 
trial, the trial was held, and the jurors were drawn from, the Eastern 
District of Oklahoma, which had been where Tulsa was located at the 
time of the crimes.149  Rejecting the defendants’ argument that the 
jury was not drawn from the district where the crime was committed 
because Tulsa was no longer within the Eastern District, the Court 
stated that “as this district had been ascertained by § 101 of the Judi-
cial code before the offenses had been committed, there was no viola-
tion of the provision of the Sixth Amendment.”150  The Court also re-
jected the defendants’ argument that their vicinage rights were 
 
144 As noted in the subsequent discussion of Duren v. Missouri, this ‘fair cross-section’ re-
quirement has properly been limited to those situations where the under-representation 
is the result of “systematic exclusion.”  Just as it is possible for a string of coin tosses to re-
sult in a disproportionate number of heads or tails, so too it is entirely possible that any 
given venire will not fairly represent all demographic groups.  The Sixth Amendment is, 
therefore, correctly directed at those situations where the under-representation can be 
traced to some systemic cause. 
145 245 U.S. 480, 481 (1918). 
146 Id. at 482. 
147 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 29, 1 Stat. 73, 88 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 28 U.S.C). 
148 Lewis v. United States, 279 U.S. 63, 66–67 (1929) (holding that the transfer of territory to 
a district outside of defendants’ arrest and their subsequent conviction in the changed 
district did not violate their constitutional rights). 
149 Id. at 67–69. 
150 Id. at 71–72. 
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violated because the jury had not been drawn from the entire district, 
citing Ruthenberg for the proposition that “the Sixth Amendment does 
not require that the accused be tried by jurors drawn from the entire 
district.”151 
While these two cases from the early twentieth century pose a 
hurdle to the textual re-framing of the ‘fair cross-section’ require-
ment in the vicinage clause, that hurdle is not insurmountable.  
While the Judiciary Act of 1789 does include the provision cited by 
the Court, Section 29 of the Judiciary Act used two definitions of the 
geographic location for drawing jurors.152  The first was for capital 
crimes where the jury had to be drawn from the county where the 
crime was committed.153  The area was defined as the district as a 
whole where the crime was committed for non-capital crimes.154  
These definitions show that “no separation between the community 
from which the jurors were summoned and the community in which 
the crime was committed was allowed by the Judiciary Act of 1789.”155 
In addition, these cases stand for no more than the proposition 
that juries may be selected from some “geographical” subset of the 
district.  They do not thereby necessarily authorize that juries may be 
selected from a ‘population’ subset of the district.  In other words, no 
matter the physical boundaries for drawing the venire, the vicinage 
clause can still be interpreted as requiring that the resulting venire 
fairly represent the community of the entire district. 
Moreover, the continued viability of these cases is questionable 
since they pre-date the Court’s ‘fair cross-section’ jurisprudence.156  
These cases are also fundamentally unsound insofar as they permit 
 
151 Id. 
152 See Kershen, Vicinage II, supra note 107, at 114 n.501 (describing two types of geographical 
areas from which jurors could be drawn). 
153 See id. (“[U]nder Section 29 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the geographical area from with-
in which jurors must be summoned for capital crimes was set as the county in which the 
crime was committed.”). 
154 See id. (“[T[he geographical area from within which the jurors must be summoned for 
noncapital crimes was set as the judicial district as a whole in which the crime was com-
mitted.”). 
155 Id.  But see Note, Does the Sixth Amendment Require a Jury of the Vicinage for State Criminal Tri-
als? A Functional Approach, 5 RUTGERS L.J. 514, 516 (1974) (arguing that selecting jurors 
from a portion of a judicial district is permissible and that a contrary position may un-
dermine the representativeness and impartiality of juries). 
156 See Kershen, Vicinage II, supra note 107, at 104–06 (examining whether a jury selection 
process which excludes a substantial number of eligible citizens is permissible); id. at 107 
(“[A]fter the Act and the Taylor decision it is urged that automatic exclusion of citizens 
on a geographical basis is a systematic and intentional exclusion . . . .”); id. at 107–08 
n.493 (recognizing that the jury panel should “reflect the population of the community 
as a whole”). 
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courts to summon jurors from a portion of the judicial district that 
does not include the locale of the crime.157  Such a construction of 
the vicinage clause is incompatible with the very concept of vicinage, 
which requires “that the geographical boundaries of the community 
where the crime was committed be identical to the geographical 
boundaries of the community within which the petit juror must re-
side.”158  Indeed, such a construction of the vicinage clause is not con-
sonant with the Anti-Federalist position that the jury should serve a 
democratizing function:  If the place of the crime is excluded from 
the area from which the jury is drawn, it would be impossible for ju-
rors to view a crime in light of the community’s values.159  The prac-
tice endorsed by the Court in these two decisions, in addition, has 
been criticized on policy grounds.160 
B.  A Sounder Construction of the ‘Fair Cross-Section’ Requirement 
The proposed textual re-framing of the ‘fair cross-section’ re-
quirement would solve the doctrinal paradox in the Court’s current 
‘fair cross-section’ jurisprudence.  As noted above, while the Court 
derives the ‘fair cross-section’ requirement from the notion of an 
“impartial jury,” a concept tied to the seated jury, the Court has li-
mited the applicability of the ‘fair cross-section’ requirement to jury 
venires.  If it is the impartiality of the seated jury that compels the in-
clusion of women, African Americans, and other minorities in the 
jury pool, then there is little doctrinal justification for not extending 
the ‘fair cross-section’ requirement to the seated jury.  On the other 
hand, if the ‘fair cross-section’ requirement is derived from the vici-
nage clause, a clause that applies only to jury venires, there is a tex-
tual basis for limiting the scope of the ‘fair cross-section’ requirement 
and excluding seated juries. 
 
157 See id. at 112 (“Is it a permissible jury selection process if it delimits the geographical 
boundaries of the community wherein the crime was committed differently from the 
geographical boundaries of the community from within which the petit jurors will be 
summoned?”). 
158 Id. at 114 (citation omitted). 
159 See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY:  THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 28 
(1994) (recognizing that, as local citizens, “the jury was our best assurance that law and 
justice accurately reflected the morals, values, and common sense of the people”). 
160 See John S. Baker, Jr., State Police Powers and the Federalization of Local Crime, 72 TEMP. L. 
REV. 673, 710–11 (1999) (arguing that such practice “obviously can greatly alter the de-
mographic composition of the jury pool and therefore can affect plea bargaining or the 
outcome of the trial”); id. (noting that the Anti-Federalists were adamant that defendants 
be tried within the county where the crime was committed, and observing that the vici-
nage provisions may entail different boundaries for a prosecution of a crime in federal 
court than for the prosecution of that crime in state court). 
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Moreover, tethering the ‘fair cross-section’ jurisprudence to the 
“district” clause would resolve the doctrinal conflict between the cur-
rent ‘fair cross-section’ jurisprudence and the Batson line of cases.  
The exclusion of women or African Americans from the jury pool, for 
instance, would be prohibited not because their absence makes the 
resulting jury “partial,” but because their systemic exclusion renders 
the jury pool to be one that is not drawn from the “district.”  There is 
no supposition being made under the “district” analysis that women 
or African Americans have distinct “flavors.”  Since there is no consti-
tutional reliance on any differing perspectives women, African Amer-
icans, or other minorities bring to the deliberations, the Court may 
more properly limit parties from exercising peremptory strikes to ex-
clude these classes of individuals. 
In addition, the proposed re-framing of the ‘fair cross-section’ re-
quirement would lead to a more textually consistent reading of the 
Sixth Amendment.  While the “impartial jury” language from which 
the Court currently derives the ‘fair cross-section’ requirement prop-
erly speaks to the seated jury, the vicinage clause speaks directly to 
the venire from which the jury is selected.161  As such, the Court’s de-
cision to restrict the ‘fair cross-section’ requirement to the jury venire 
as opposed to the seated jury poses no doctrinal conflict. 
Finally, such textual re-casting of the ‘fair cross-section’ require-
ment leads to a jurisprudence that is more faithful to the Framers’ 
understanding of “representativeness” that is embodied in the Sixth 
Amendment.  At the time of the Founding, the Federalists and Anti-
Federalists fundamentally disagreed on their notions of representa-
tiveness.  The difference in the theories of representation is illu-
strated by the differing philosophical grounding of the Federalists 
and the Anti-Federalists.  Anti-Federalists preferred a classical founda-
 
161 The emphasis on the “district” instead of the “State and district” is due to the fact that this 
narrowing of the source of the jury pool to the “district” where the crime was committed 
is one of the features that distinguishes the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial from 
the right to a jury trial in Article III of the Constitution.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The 
Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the 
said Crimes shall have been committed . . . .”).  The latter only requires that the jury be 
drawn from the State where the crime occurred.  In other words, the salient feature of 
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is that the jury be drawn not only from the State 
where the crime occurred, but also more importantly from the district where it occurred.  
See Amar, supra note 1, at 1197 (“[W]hy did the first Congress add the jury clause of the 
Sixth Amendment?  The historical answer is unequivocal:  To guarantee a right to a trial 
within the district of the crime.  Article III had not specified jury trial of ‘the vicinage,’ as 
per the prevailing common law, and many Anti-Federalists wanted an explicit guarantee 
that juries would be organized around local rather than statewide communities.” (citation 
omitted)). 
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tion for their view of representation, viewing representation as an an-
cient theory that was “as old as the history of mankind.”162  For the 
Anti-Federalists, representation required “mirror representation,” or 
the reflection of all classes, interests, and groups in society.163  Such 
representation could only be achieved through local governance or, 
at the very least, very small and numerous legislative districts.164  In 
contrast, the Federalists preferred more contemporary theories, ar-
guing that representation had developed in “modern Europe” with 
thinkers such as Locke.165  The Federalists rejected the mirror repre-
sentation model, instead arguing that the best form of representation 
is that which accounts for the nation’s aggregate private interests.166  
Modern commentators have argued that Federalist theories of repre-
sentation can be summarized by a single principle:  “Objective inter-
ests, objectively arrived at.”167 
The perceived importance of objectivity in government served as 
the foundation for the Federalist preference for large republics and 
 
162 Wilson Carey McWilliams, The Anti-Federalists, Representations, and Party, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 
12, 12 (1989).  In his concurring opinion in Berghuis v. Smith, Justice Thomas argued that, 
since juries at the founding were not representative of the community insofar as their 
composition was largely limited to white men who were property owners, the Sixth 
Amendment’s right to jury fails to provide a basis for the ‘fair cross-section’ requirement.  
See 130 S.Ct. 1382, 1396 (2010).  Rather, he argued, the ‘fair cross-section’ right was de-
rived from an “amalgamation of the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. at 372 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting)).  This argument does not preclude grounding the ‘fair cross-section’ 
requirement in the vicinage clause.  Whatever the set of eligible jurors, the Anti-Federalist 
theory of mirror representation reflected in the Sixth Amendment would require that 
that groups be fairly represented.  So, at a time that only white men were eligible to be ju-
rors, the ‘fair cross-section’ requirement would have required that the jury venire fairly 
reflect that subset of the population.  When the set of eligible jurors was broadened to in-
clude African American men, then the ‘fair cross-section’ requirement would have re-
quired that the venire fairly reflect the subset of the population that consists of white and 
African American men.  Finally, when the set of eligible jurors was expanded to include 
women, then the ‘fair cross-section’ requirement would have required that the jury venire 
fairly reflect the composition of the entire community in terms of racial and gender 
groups. 
163 Yasmin Dawood, The New Inequality:  Constitutional Democracy and the Problem of Wealth, 67 
MD. L. REV. 123, 138 (2007). 
164 See id. (describing the Anti-Federalists’ concerns about representation in a “large and ex-
tended nation”). 
165 See McWilliams, supra note 162, at 12–13 (“The framers of the Constitution of the United 
States were informed by the teaching, now familiar to most Americans, that human be-
ings are by nature free, independent, and engrossed in private aims, especially the desire 
for self-preservation.” (citation omitted)). 
166 See id. at 14 (“The Federalists were emphatic, however, in holding that there exists an ob-
jective, collective interest which, favoring out subjectivities, forms the true standard for 
representative rule.” (citation omitted)). 
167 Id. at 15. 
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small legislatures.168  In the view of the Federalists, such large gov-
ernments provide a more accurate reflection of the nation’s aggre-
gate private interests and therefore better preserve private liberty.169  
Federalists preferred small legislatures as a means of “refining” public 
opinion and minimizing the effects of small factions.170  James Madi-
son’s first two Federalist Papers, The Federalist No. 10 and The Federalist 
No. 14, help illustrate the interaction between the Federalist concept 
of representation and the size of the legislature relative to the size of 
the nation.171  According to Madison, direct democracy was impossi-
ble in any large nation, and citizens were thus forced to rely on a 
small body of citizens to represent their interests.172  In Madison’s 
view, a small group of representatives could “refine” opinion and 
“produce more virtuous, wise, and stable decisions.”173  Madison ar-
gued that a larger legislature would dilute the effectiveness of repre-
sentation by impeding deliberation.174  By keeping the legislature 
small, the Federalists hoped to promote the objective interests they 
favored by minimizing the efficacy of small groups or factions. 
In broad terms, the Federalist theory of representation was partial-
ly aimed at preventing a “tyranny of the minority.”  In The Federalist 
No. 10, Madison recognized that a large republic and very large legis-
lative districts would contain increased numbers of the small, local 
factions that the Federalists feared.175  However, in Madison’s opi-
nion, a large republic would protect against tyranny from either ma-
jority or minority factions by ensuring that any majority positions 
would be “incoherent,” thus guaranteeing that the legislature would 
agree on only a small number of measures.176  Thus, ideal representa-
tion would come not from self-restraint of citizens but from the grid-
lock created by a diversity of representation.177 
The Anti-Federalist theory of representation demanded mirror 
representation, a concept that was wholly incompatible with the Fe-
deralist call for small legislatures and large electoral districts.  Brutus, 
 
168 See id. (explaining the Federalist defense of a large republic). 
169 See id. 
170 See Amar, supra note 1, at 1139 (stating the benefits of having a “small, select group of 
representatives”). 
171 See id. 
172 See id. (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 14, at 100 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). 
173 See id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 19, at 82 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). 
174 See id. 
175 See McWilliams, supra note 162, at 17 (“Madison contended that a large republic may em-
brace so great a variety of interests and factions that any majority will be incoherent, and 
unable to agree on more than a limited number of goals and measures.”). 
176 See id.  
177 See id. 
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one of the most influential and important Anti-Federalist writers, of-
fered a summary of the Anti-Federalist view of ideal representation:  
“In this assembly, the farmer, merchant, mecanick [sic], and other 
various orders of people, ought to be represented according to their 
respective weight and numbers . . . .”178  On this view, Anti-Federalists 
argued that true representation could only come when the legislature 
reflected all of the groups in society in their respective proportions.  
Absent such reflective representation, in the words of Brutus, “the 
representation is nominal—a mere burlesque.”179  Brutus further ar-
gued that mirror representation in the new government was the best 
means of promoting the public’s happiness, which should be the un-
derlying goal of any representative system: 
Society instituted government to promote the happiness of the whole, 
and this is the great end always in view in the delegation of powers.  It 
must then have been intended, that those who are placed instead of the 
people, should possess their sentiments and feelings, and be governed by 
their interests, or, in other words, should bear the strongest resemblance 
of those in whose room they are substituted.180 
The Federal Farmer, another highly influential Anti-Federalist writer, 
argued that a government lacking true representation would inter-
fere with the ability of the public to achieve the happiness that gov-
ernment was created to protect: 
A virtuous and happy people by laws uncongenial to their characters, 
may easily be gradually changed into servile and depraved creatures.  
Where the people, or their representatives, make the laws, it is probable 
they will generally be fitted to the national character and circumstances, 
unless the representation be partial, and the imperfect substitute for the 
people.181 
With these broad representative theories in mind, the Anti-Federalists 
countered the Federalist position on legislative size by arguing that 
the proposed Congress took the idea of refining opinion too far.182  
The Anti-Federalists feared that the small legislature would restrict 
the ability to participate in the body to the elite, men with “reputa-
tions over wide geographic areas.”183  Such broad geographic appeal 
ran counter to the Anti-Federalist preference for localism, which was 
a tool to ensure that representation mirrored the diverse composition 
 
178 HERBERT STORING, THE ANTI-FEDERALIST, 125 (1985). 
179 Id. at 126. 
180 Id. at 125. 
181 Id. at 75. 
182 See Amar, supra note 1, at 1139–40 (“Probably the deepest Anti-Federalist objection to the 
Constitution was that the document took the skimming principle too far:  Congress was 
too small, too ‘refined.’”). 
183 Id. at 1139.  
964 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 13:4 
 
of the country by including members of small groups or factions.  An 
Anti-Federalist pamphlet from Pennsylvania specifically pointed to 
the proposed size of the U.S. Senate as a hindrance to achieving ideal 
representation.  At the time, the size of the Senate was pegged at 
twenty-five or twenty-six members, leading the pamphlet’s author to 
state that “the sense and views of 3 or 4 millions of people . . . cannot 
be collected in so small a body.”184 
In contrast to the small legislature that the Federalists favored, the 
Anti-Federalists’ view of representation demanded a much larger 
body with very small electoral districts.  The Federal Farmer argued 
that the Federalist view of representation would unfairly silence the 
voices of many groups in society, stating that “a fair and equal repre-
sentation is that in which the interests, feelings, opinions and views of 
the people are collected, in such a manner as they would be were the 
people all assembled.”185  In the Federal Farmer’s view, the Federalist-
proposed representative size was “unsubstantial and ought to be in-
creased” so as to achieve the goal that the legislature act as though 
the people were present.186  More specifically, Anti-Federalists feared 
that a small legislative body would have a disproportionate impact on 
the poor or “middling classes.”187  Melancton Smith, a prominent New 
York City Anti-Federalist, argued that the legislature could include 
members of the “natural aristocracy,” but not in numbers that ex-
ceeded their proportion in society: 
The number of representatives should be so large, as that while it em-
braces men of the first class, it should admit those of the middling class 
of life.  I am convinced that this Government is so constituted, that the 
representatives will generally be composed of the first class in the com-
munity, which I shall distinguish by the name of the natural aristocracy of 
the country.188 
Aside from the size of the proposed Congress, Federalists also 
weighed in their conceptions of how representatives should behave 
when they were elected.  In keeping with the Federalist emphasis on 
objectivity, Alexander Hamilton argued that representatives should 
minimize their own ambitions in favor of “the principle or love of 
glory.”189  In Hamilton’s view, the Federalist’s view of formal represen-
 
184 STORING, supra note 178, at 214. 
185 Id. at 74. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 340–41. 
188 Id. at 340. 
189 McWilliams, supra note 162, at 18 (quoting Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James 
Baynard (Jan. 16, 1801), reprinted in 10 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 417 (H. 
Lodge ed. 1903)). 
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tation was the most effective way of protecting that individual virtue 
by pitting interests against each other and thus diluting the effective-
ness of any potentially dominant faction.190  In the Federalist view, the 
ideal representative “reflects the interests of his constituents, but not 
their subjective feelings and parochial opinions.”191  There was a noti-
ceable interplay between the Federalist concept of the ideal repre-
sentative and the size of the legislature.  The Federalist-preferred size 
of the legislature assisted in assuring membership of such ideal repre-
sentatives by shielding members from local “passion and discord,” 
which would distract from the goal of representing the new nation’s 
objective, aggregate interests.192  Furthermore, James Madison wrote 
that “unworthy candidates” would be less likely to find electoral suc-
cess in large districts.193  Large districts would protect the Federalists’ 
precious objectiveness by ensuring that local factions, or in Madison’s 
words, “little demagogues,” would be unable to resort to “the vicious 
arts, by which elections are too often carried,” such as intrigue and 
intimidation.194 
Anti-Federalists were more vague in their conception of how indi-
vidual legislators should behave.  Such relative silence may be a 
product of their mirror representation theory.  However, Hanna 
Pitkin’s seminal work The Concept of Representation helps clarify the in-
teraction between mirror representation and the behavior of individ-
ual representatives.  In terms of modern political theory, Anti-
Federalists, with their preference for mirror representation, could be 
defined as “proportionalists” who argue that accurate reflection of 
the population in the representative body is critical to achieving true 
representation.195  Proportionalists believe that the composition of the 
legislature will determine the actions that it will take as a whole.196  
Thus, the actions of representatives are secondary to who the repre-
sentatives are; proportionalists focus their theory on the individual 
members of the legislature without specifically considering any duties 
those representatives may owe to their constituents.  The Anti-
Federalist silence on the preferred actions of individual legislators 
can be seen as a product of their “zeal for accurate reflection in the 
 
190 See id. (“[Hamilton] was content to rest the Constitution on formal representation and 
the complex balances which pit interest against interest.”). 
191 Id. at 16. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. at 17 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 63 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961)). 
194 Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 63 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961)). 
195 See HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 61–62 (1967) (discussing 
the different metaphors used to describe the “proportionalist” approach). 
196 Id. at 63. 
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composition of the legislature.”197  The composition of Congress was 
more significant to Anti-Federalists than what the members of that 
body would do once elected. 
The differing theories of representation the Federalists and Anti-
Federalists employed also dictated their respective views on jury is-
sues.  The Anti-Federalist concern over giving the “middling classes” a 
voice in government helped shape that group’s view of who would 
most benefit from jury service.  The leading Anti-Federalist Maryland 
Farmer wrote that jury service would uplift the lower classes and “se-
cure to the people at large, their just and rightful controul [sic] in 
the government.”198  Anti-Federalists viewed the jury as playing an 
integral role in achieving mirror or proportional representation by 
reflecting “the morals, values, and common sense of the people asked 
to obey the law.”199  One Anti-Federalist writer went so far as to distri-
bute a pamphlet that claimed representation on juries was even more 
important than representation in the legislature.200  The importance 
of the Anti-Federalist representative theory with regard to juries is 
well understood today.  Modern commentators have noted that “we 
are using the Anti-Federalist model when we say that a jury should be 
‘representative’ of the community.”201 
With the emphasis Anti-Federalists placed on jury service as a part 
of their overarching representative theory, vicinage played an impor-
tant role in their arguments concerning juries.  They believed that 
the jury could serve as a democratic institution as long as it was prac-
ticed locally, on a “scale small enough to ‘secure to the people at 
large, their just and rightful controul [sic] in the judicial depart-
ment.’”202  The concept of vicinage played a particularly important 
role in the Anti-Federalist view of the jury, with the Federal Farmer 
calling a trial by a jury of the vicinage one of the two essential 
rights.203  For many Anti-Federalists, vicinage “equated . . . with the 
jury right,” with Richard Henry Lee equating vicinage with the jury 
 
197 Id. at 64. 
198 Amar, supra note 1, at 1187 (citations omitted). 
199 ABRAMSON, supra note 159, at 28. 
200 Christopher Waldrep, Black Access to Law in Reconstruction:  The Case of Warren County, Mis-
sissippi, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 583, 588 (1994). 
201 Daniel Walker Howe, Anti-Federalist/Federalist Dialogue and Its Implications for Constitutional 
Understanding, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1989). 
202 ABRAMSON, supra note 159, at 29 (quoting STORING, supra note 178, at 320). 
203 See STORING, supra note 178, at 39 (“The essential parts of a free and good government 
are a full and equal representation of the people in the legislature, and the jury trial of 
the vicinage in the administration of justice . . . .”). 
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right itself.204  Anti-Federalists believed that true representation could 
be achieved through the jury, but only if local juries were man-
dated.205  Any attempt to exclude vicinage from federal jury proce-
dure was seen as a “plan to subvert popular government.”206  The im-
portance Anti-Federalists placed on vicinage as part of their 
representative goals is illustrated by the parallels some drew between 
representation in the legislature and on the jury: 
It is essential in every free country, that common people should have a 
part and share of influence, in the judicial as well as in the legislative de-
partment . . . . The trial by jury in the judicial department, and the col-
lection of the people by their representatives in the legislature . . . have 
procured for them, in this country, their true proportion of influence, 
and the wisest and most fit means of protecting themselves in the com-
munity.  Their situation, as jurors and representatives, enables them to 
acquire information and knowledge in the affairs and government of the 
society; and to come forward, in turn, as the centinels and guardians of 
each other.207 
Anti-Federalists believed that juries served democracy not just 
through its fact-finding function, but also “by getting the people 
right.”208  According to these writers, the local jury accurately reflect-
ed the morals and values of the community and provided an oppor-
tunity for “common people . . . [to] have a part and share of influ-
ence in the judicial . . . department.”209  For the Anti-Federalists, the 
smaller the area from which jurors were drawn, the more likely it was 
that it would achieve the ideal of mirror representation.  Along with 
the Anti-Federalist preference for localism and representation of var-
ious community groups, the Anti-Federalists would have preferred a 
vicinage provision mandating the drawing of juries from the neigh-
borhood of the crime.210 
 
204 Daniel D. Blinka, “This Germ of Rottedness”:  Federal Trials in the New Republic, 1789–1807, 36 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 135, 153 (2003). 
205 See ABRAMSON, supra note 159, at 29 (“The Anti-Federalists constantly pointed out that the 
proposed republic was too large and the numbers of representatives too small to provide 
genuine dialogue between most citizens and their representatives. . . . By contrast, trial by 
jury could remain an oasis of genuine democracy, if practiced on a scale small 
enough . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
206 Matthew P. Harrington, The Law-Finding Function of the American Jury, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 
377, 398 (1999). 
207 Amar, supra note 1, at 1188 (citations omitted). 
208 ABRAMSON, supra note 159, at 28. 
209 STORING, supra note 178, at 249. 
210 See Simon Stern, Note, Between Local Knowledge and National Politics:  Debating Rationales for 
Jury Nullification After Bushell’s Case, 111 YALE L.J. 1815, 1853 (2002) (noting that Anti-
Federalists pushed for a vicinage requirement for criminal defendants). 
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In furthering their arguments in favor of vicinage, several Anti-
Federalists focused on the inconveniences created by denying the vi-
cinage right.  Many Anti-Federalists distributed pamphlets outlining 
the inconveniences that defendants would suffer, including measur-
ing the miles that they would have to travel to reach the place of trial, 
if vicinage was not included in the Constitution.211  The Federal Far-
mer was among these writers, noting that defendants would have to 
travel “150 or 200 miles” for trial without the vicinage right.212  Patrick 
Henry also weighed in on the importance of the vicinage right, stat-
ing that the federal government could “shop” a state for a favorable 
jury.213  According to Henry, it would have been preferable that “trial 
by jury were struck out altogether” than adopt a system of jury trial 
absent the vicinage right.214 
In addition to arguments concerning the democratizing function 
of local juries and the inconveniences caused by non-local juries, An-
ti-Federalists also focused on the jury’s fact-finding mission.215  Ac-
cording to many leading Anti-Federalists, including Patrick Henry 
and James Winthrop, local juries had an advantage in fact finding be-
cause local jurors were more likely “acquainted with [the defen-
dants’] characters, their good or bad conduct in life, to judge of the 
unfortunate man who may be thus exposed by the rigors of govern-
ment.”216  Winthrop, whose influential Anti-Federalist essays were writ-
ten under the pseudonym Agrippa, wrote that jurors from afar would 
be unable to judge whether the defendant was “habitually a good or 
bad man.”217 
Just as the Anti-Federalist theory of mirror representation led to 
their favorable view of vicinage, the Federalist demand for objectivity 
served as the basis of that group’s general opposition to vicinage.  
The Federalists feared that vicinage would interfere with the ability to 
represent objective interests by giving too large a voice to local, mi-
nority passions or prejudices.218  Essentially, Federalists were con-
 
211 See ABRAMSON, supra note 159, at 23 (noting that Anti-Federalist pamphlets “measured 
out the miles, the distances, the inconveniences, and the disadvantages that an accused 
would suffer when the federal government had free choice of both venue and jury any-
where within a state”). 
212 STORING, supra note 178, at 40. 
213 ABRAMSON, supra note 159, at 22–23. 
214 Id. at 23 (citation omitted). 
215 See id. at 27 (“One argument centered on the fact-finding mission of juries, a mission that 
local jurors with personal knowledge of the case could accomplish more accurately.”). 
216 Id. (citations omitted). 
217 Id. 
218 See id. at 28 (stating that jurors from the community would have “knowledge of the wit-
nesses and their reputations”). 
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cerned that local juries created through a vicinage right would be 
unable to render impartial verdicts.  Governor Johnston of North 
Carolina, a Federalist, wrote in response to the Anti-Federalists that: 
We may expect less partiality when the trial is by strangers; and were I to 
be tried for my property or life, I would rather be tried by disinterested 
men, who were not biased, than by men who were perhaps intimate 
friends of my opponent.219 
The decision to include a vicinage provision in the Sixth Amend-
ment, therefore, reflected an incorporation of the Anti-Federalist 
theory of mirror representation.  Grounding the ‘fair cross-section’ 
requirement in the vicinage clause would be faithful to this notion of 
representativeness. 
C.  A More Robust ‘Fair Cross-Section’ Requirement 
As noted earlier, re-framing the ‘fair cross-section’ requirement by 
changing the textual tether from the “impartial jury” provision to the 
vicinage provision would allow for disentangling the ‘fair cross-
section’ jurisprudence from equal protection jurisprudence.  Since 
the vicinage requirement does not involve an analysis of whether the 
excluded group of potential jurors has a unique “flavor” that might 
impact the jury’s “impartiality,” the exclusion of any demographically 
distinct group would contravene the Sixth Amendment, not just the 
exclusion of distinct groups that may share unique perspectives.  This 
disentanglement of the ‘fair cross-section’ requirement from the 
Equal Protection Clause would dramatically increase the scope of the 
‘fair cross-section’ requirement. 
As of the end of 2008, a majority of states allow automatic exemp-
tions from jury service to statutorily defined groups.  Many of these 
exemptions are offered to those who are above a certain age,220 have 
 
219 Id. at 26 (citations omitted). 
220 Thirty-five states allow for some automatic exemptions from jury service.  Non-
occupational exemptions include automatic exemptions for potential jurors over a cer-
tain age.  Twenty-one states allow for an age exemption, which exempts ages ranging 
from sixty-five to eighty years old.  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-202 (1956); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 51-217 (2005); FLA. STAT. § 40.013 (2010), available at 
http://leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&U
RL=0000-0099/0040/Sections/0040.013.html; GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-1 (2008); HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 612-6 (2007); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-306 (LexisNexis 2006); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1307a (West 1996); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-5-25 (1999); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1601 (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. § 6.020 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
500-A:9 (LexisNexis 1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2B:20-10 (West 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-
6.1 (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2313.16 (LexisNexis 2005); OKLA. STAT. tit. 38, § 28 
(2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 10.050 (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 22-1-103 (1994); TEX. GOV’T 
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recently served on a petit or grand jury,221 or have specific familial ob-
ligations that are presumed to place a substantial burden on the po-
tential juror.222  Additionally, nearly twenty states retain some form of 
automatic exemption for members of certain occupations.223  The 
 
CODE ANN. § 62.106 (West 2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 52-1-8 (LexisNexis 2008); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 1-11-104 (2009). 
221 Twelve states allow exemptions for those who have served on a jury within a specific time 
period.  These states include Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Kansas, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas, and West Virginia.  See 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-31-103 (1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-71-105 (2008); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 51-217 (2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 43-158 (2009); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 234A, § 4 
(2000); MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 808, available at http://www.mncourts.gov/rules/general/
GRtitleIX.htm#g808ix; MO. REV. STAT. § 494.425 (2004), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2B:20-10 (West 
2010); N.M. STAT. § 38-5-2 (2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 28 (West 2009); TEX. GOV’T 
CODE ANN. § 62.106 (West 2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 52-1-8 (LexisNexis 2008). 
222 Familial exemptions include exemptions for nursing mothers.  States with such exemp-
tions are Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Oregon.  See 705 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/10.3 (West 2007); IOWA CODE § 607A.5 (2009); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 43-158 (2009); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-5-23 (West 1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1601 
(2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 38 § 28 (West 2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 10.050 (2007).  Addi-
tionally, a number of states allow exemptions for potential jurors who are caregivers for 
disabled family members.  See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-71-105 (2008); FLA. STAT. § 40.013 
(2010), available at http://leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_
Statute&Search_String=&URL=0000-0099/0040/Sections/0040.013.html; GA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 15-12-1 to -2 (2008); IOWA CODE § 607A.5 (2009); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 234A § 4 (Lex-
isNexis 2000); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 62.106 (West 2005). 
223 States that allow for occupation-based exemptions include Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and 
Wyoming.  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-201 (2002) (exempting peace officers); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 51-217 (West 2005) (exempting state constitutional officers, state judges, 
and members of the General Assembly); FLA. STAT. § 40.013 (2010), available at 
http://leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&U
RL=0000-0099/0040/Sections/0040.013.html (exempting the governor, lieutenant gov-
ernor, cabinet members, court clerks, federal or state law enforcement officers, attorneys, 
and physicians); GA. CODE. ANN. 15-12-1 (2008) (exempting post-secondary students dur-
ing the time school is in session, teachers engaged in home-school programs while those 
programs are in session, and members of the Georgia legislature while the legislature is in 
session); HAW. REV. STAT. § 612-6 (2007) (exempting elected officials while the legislature 
is in session; county, state, or federal judges; members of the armed forces deployed out-
of-state; active members of police or fire departments; active members of an emergency 
medical services agency; and actively practicing physicians or dentists); 14 ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 1211 (2005) (exempting the governor, judges, physicians, dentists, veterinarians, 
sheriffs, attorneys); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-306 (LexisNexis 2006) (ex-
empting members of Congress, active duty members of the armed forces, and members 
of organized militias); MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 808, available at 
http://www.mncourts.gov/rules/general/GRtitleIX.htm#g808ix (exempting judges); 
MO ST 494.425 (2004) (exempting judges and healthcare workers); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-
1601 (2008) (exempting judges, clerks of state courts, sheriffs, and jailers); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 6.020 (LexisNexis 2008) (exempting legislators and police officers); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2B:20-10 (West 2010) (exempting those who “provide highly specialized 
technical health care services for which replacement cannot be reasonably obtained,” 
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most common exempted professionals are elected officials, attorneys, 
members of the state and federal judiciary branches, police officers, 
and medical professionals.  These occupational exemptions were 
originally justified with three broad arguments.  First, some occupa-
tions were deemed too important to society to allow members of 
those professions to interrupt their duties for long periods of time.  
Second, states viewed certain professional expertise as a hindrance in 
weighing evidence presented at trial.  Third, states were concerned 
that the ethical or moral responsibilities of some occupations con-
flicted with the duties of jury service.224 
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the Sixth Amend-
ment implications of modern occupational exemptions to jury ser-
vice.  However, the Court did state as early as 1906 that the practice 
in Georgia of excluding doctors, dentists, lawyers, and ministers from 
jury service did not create constitutional concerns.225  It is unclear 
whether that holding remains good law in light of the Court’s more 
recent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.  However, the Court did 
state in dicta in Taylor that states are free to grant exemptions to 
“those engaged in particular occupations the uninterrupted perfor-
 
health care workers directly involved in the care of a handicapped person for whom a re-
placement cannot be obtained, instructional staff of grammar and high schools, and vo-
lunteer members of fire departments of first aid or rescue squads); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2313.16 (West 2008) (exempting cloistered members of religious organizations); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 28 (West 2009) (exempting judges of the state supreme court, court 
of criminal appeals, court of civil appeals, or district court; sheriffs or sheriff deputies; li-
censed attorneys; legislators; and jailors); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4503 (2002) (exempting 
members of the armed forces); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9–9–3 (2010) (exempting legislators, 
other elected officials, the jury commissioner and his assistants, judges, court clerks, at-
torneys, police officers, probation and parole officers, fire fighters, and members of the 
armed forces); TENN. CODE ANN. § 22-1-103 (1994) (exempting federal or state elected 
officials, practicing attorneys, teachers, members of fire companies or law enforcement 
agencies, pharmacists, nurses, members of the armed forces or national guard, and those 
who operate their businesses as sole proprietors); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-341 (1998) (ex-
empting the President and Vice President of the United States, Governor, Lieutenant 
Governor, Attorney General of Virginia, members of Congress, members of the General 
Assembly, practicing attorneys, judges, law enforcement officers, superintendents and of-
ficers of state and regional jails); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 52-1-8 (LexisNexis 2008) (exempt-
ing state or federal office holders); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-11-103 (2009) (exempting 
elected public officials, salaried members of an organized fire department, and active 
members of a police department). 
224 See Michael B. Mushlin, Bound and Gagged:  The Peculiar Predicament of Professional Jurors, 25 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 239, 246 (2007) (“Clergy argued that jury service would violate their 
professional ethics, forcing them to make the type of judgments about other human be-
ings that were incompatible with their religious responsibilities.”). 
225 See Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S. 638, 639–40 (1906) (finding that the exclusion of certain 
professions from jury service was not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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mance of which is critical to the community’s welfare.”226  Such ex-
emptions are apparently not problematic under the Court’s current 
‘fair cross-section’ formulation. 
Despite the Supreme Court’s apparent endorsement of occupa-
tional exemptions, the trend among states is to abolish such exemp-
tions or limit the number of professions exempted from jury service.  
The trend toward abolishing occupational-based exemptions began 
with Chief Judge Judith Kaye’s efforts to reform the New York system 
in the mid-1990s.  By 1994, New York had over two dozen occupa-
tional exemptions, and the efforts eliminating those exemptions were 
largely premised on two rationales.  First, automatic occupational ex-
emptions exacerbated a juror shortage that led to non-exempt jurors 
being called very regularly to serve long periods of time.  As Judge 
Kaye pointed out, qualified jurors were called every two years to serve 
almost two weeks at a time.227  The second argument was based on the 
idea of fundamental fairness.  New York reforms were aimed at 
spreading the burden of jury service among more groups of citizens 
and sending a message that “no group is more privileged, or less im-
portant, when it comes to jury service, and no one gets excused au-
tomatically from this fundamental right, and obligation, of citizen-
ship.”228 
The success of eliminating automatic occupational exemptions in 
New York has influenced other states to follow suit.  The two primary 
rationales behind the New York reforms have proven especially in-
fluential as other states have either limited the number of occupa-
tional exemptions or wholly abolished them.  One significant model 
for jury reform in the states has been the Jury Patriotism Act (“JPA”), 
a model act drafted by the American Legislative Exchange Council 
(“ALEC”) which recommends the complete abolition of occupational 
exemptions.229  The JPA is premised mostly on the two rationales un-
derlying the New York reforms.  ALEC is concerned that exemptions 
have caused artificial juror shortages that lead to delays and other in-
 
226 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 534 (1975) (citing Rawlins, 201 U.S. at 638).  In Berghuis 
v. Smith, the Court observed that the categorical exemptions referred to in Taylor were of-
fered as examples of the type of evidence the State might produce to rebut a prima facie 
showing by the defendant of under-representativeness.  See 130 S.Ct. 1382, 1395 (2010). 
227 See Judith S. Kaye, My Life as Chief Judge:  The Chapter on Juries, N.Y. ST. B.A.J., Oct. 2006, at 
10, 11 (“By the early 1990s in New York, we were calling the same people every two years 
like clockwork . . . .”). 
228 Id. at 12. 
229  Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens, & Cary Silverman, The Jury Patriotism Act:  Making 
Jury Service More Appealing and Rewarding to Citizens, ST. FACTOR, Apr. 2003. 
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efficiencies in the juror system.230  Additionally, the JPA endorses the 
broad fundamental fairness rationale used in New York.231  ALEC 
supports the ABA position that “‘broad categorical exemptions not 
only reduce the inclusiveness and representativeness of a jury panel, 
but also place a disproportionate burden on those who are not ex-
empt,’ most notably blue-collar workers, the retired, and the unem-
ployed.”232  However, there is a strong counterargument to the fun-
damental fairness rationale adopted in New York and other states.  
Some professions, such as police officers and some attorneys, already 
play a role in the criminal justice system, and exempting them would 
not necessarily allow those professionals to shirk their participatory 
duties.233  Nevertheless, states have found this two-prong rationale 
particularly persuasive as several states have adopted versions of the 
model act that have either eliminated or reduced occupational ex-
emptions.  Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Louisiana, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, Ohio, Oklahoma, Utah, Maryland, Texas, and Vermont have 
adopted portions of the JPA in reforming their jury systems.234  Most 
recently, Tennessee wholly eliminated occupational exemptions to 
jury service.235 
Although the states do not appear to have specifically contem-
plated the Sixth Amendment implications of automatic occupational 
exemptions, some commentators contend that such exemptions are 
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s ‘fair cross-section’ require-
ment.  These commentators argue that exempting members of cer-
tain professions is contrary to the Supreme Court’s acknowledgement 
that the community is made up of distinctive groups with unique 
viewpoints that should be represented in the jury venire.  While ad-
mitting that there may be strong arguments for occupational exemp-
 
230 See Kristin Armshaw, Why Every State Should Have a Jury Patriotism Act:  Bad Excuses and 
Broad Exemptions Are Hurting Our Jury Pools, FINDLAW (July 14, 2004), 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20040714_armshaw.html (“The result of no-
shows and the overuse of hardship excuses has often been dire[,]. . . . [and the]lack of ju-
rors caused trials to be delayed or rescheduled.”). 
231 See id. (arguing that under the JPA “[b]oth justice and fairness will be advanced”). 
232 Mark A. Behrens & Andrew W. Crouse, The Evolving Civil Justice Reform Movement:  Proce-
dural Reforms Have Gained Steam, But Critics Still Focus on Arguments of the Past, 31 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 173, 202 (2006) (quoting AM. BAR ASSN., STANDARDS RELATED TO JUROR 
USE & MANAGEMENT 51 (1993)). 
233 See Darryl K. Brown, The Means and Ends of Representative Juries, 1 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 
445, 470 n.106 (1994) (“Police officers, for example, are almost always peremptorily 
struck by criminal defendants, and one might argue that they already play a public service 
role in the criminal justice system.”). 
234 See Behrens & Crouse, supra note 232, at 203 (listing the states which have adopted legis-
lation based on the JPA). 
235  TENN. CODE ANN. § 22–1–103 (2009). 
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tions, some argue that “every exemption of an occupation makes a 
pool a less accurate cross-section of the community; police officers 
are a segment of every community, as are physicians, attorneys, and 
other occupations frequently excused from service.”236  However, it 
appears unlikely that the Court would endorse this viewpoint given its 
statement in Taylor that the exclusion of certain occupations was un-
likely to “pose substantial threats that the remaining pool of jurors 
would not be representative of the community.”237  Additionally, some 
articles point to empirical data that suggests occupation is a poor in-
dicator of juror viewpoint, and therefore occupational exemptions 
may not actually threaten the ability of states to achieve a ‘fair cross-
section’ for venires.  In arguing for a reformulation of the test for 
finding a “distinctive group” for Sixth Amendment purposes, Mitchell 
Zuklie points to a 1970s study that indicated that income was a much 
stronger predictor of juror attitude than was occupation.238  With such 
studies in mind, it is possible that occupational exemptions do not 
impair the impartiality of jury venires and therefore are not necessari-
ly in conflict with the ‘fair cross-section’ requirement. 
Additionally, some commentators argue that occupational exemp-
tions cause educational deficits in venires that impair the ability of ju-
ries to weigh evidence in complex matters adequately.  As Professor 
Vikram David Amar points out, the public is often frustrated by in-
consistent or “stupid” results from jury trials.239  He argues that auto-
matic occupational exemptions artificially limit the educational levels 
of potential jurors and that ending such exemptions would produce 
more consistent results:  
The idea of the jury is rooted in equality; just as all defendants are 
treated equally before the law, all jurors have equal claims, as well as ob-
ligations, to play a part in the administration of justice.  Limiting exemp-
tions would expand the size of the jury pool, enforce the universality of 
required service, and raise the education level of juries.240 
The most common exemptions are for highly educated profes-
sions, most notably attorneys, physicians, and members of legislative 
bodies.  As Hillel Levin and John Emerson point out, the changing 
nature of trials calls for more educated jurors at the time that approx-
 
236 Brown, supra note 233, at 470. 
237 Taylor v. Lousiana, 419 U.S. 522, 534 (1975). 
238 Zuklie, supra note 64, at 140. 
239 See Vikram David Amar, More on What’s Wrong with the Modern Jury:  How Juror Selection Can 
Be Improved, FINDLAW (Feb. 20, 2004), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/
20040220.html (finding that Americans are dissatisfied by the performance of modern ju-
ries and their decisions “seem out of step with American values and common sense”). 
240 Id. 
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imately one-third of states exempt the most educated from jury ser-
vice.  “As trials become more complex, it would be perverse if rela-
tively educated members of pools—who may be the very best kinds of 
jurors—were systematically excluded from jury service.”241  However, it 
should be noted that Levin and Emerson’s empirical study did not 
find that juries in Connecticut were substantially less educated than 
was the state’s population, despite Connecticut’s relatively long list of 
occupational exemptions.  Additionally, it appears that New York case 
law has interpreted the reforms there to have been at least partially 
influenced by a desire to increase the educational levels of jury ve-
nires.  “In passing, we note also that the policy goals of recent jury 
reform measures that eliminated exemptions . . . . This reform plainly 
contemplates that a class of professional individuals should contri-
bute their ‘wisdom and life experiences to the deliberative 
process.’”242 
Although the trend in the states has clearly been to limit or wholly 
eliminate occupational exemptions, there are a number of arguments 
in support of maintaining such exemptions.  Arguments in favor tend 
to fall in one of three broad categories.  First, there are some occupa-
tions that are unlikely to survive voir dire, and it is therefore ineffi-
cient to summon members of those professions.  For example, police 
officers are unlikely to be selected to sit on a petit jury, although 
many states have eliminated automatic exemptions for such profes-
sionals.243  Second, some argue that there are professionals whose ab-
sence from work may cause public inconvenience.  The most notable 
example is physicians with very inflexible professional schedules.  
Physicians are especially concerned that being summoned for jury 
service will create a substantial hardship for their patients.244  Finally, 
there is an argument that not exempting certain professions may 
cause substantial personal hardship for those summoned.  The Vera 
Institute of Justice study points specifically to the increasing numbers 
of jurors in New York who identify themselves as either self-employed 
 
241 Hillel Y. Levin & John W. Emerson, Is There a Bias Against Education in the Jury Selection 
Process?, 38 CONN. L. REV. 325, 327 (2006) (citations omitted). 
242 People v. Maragh, 729 N.E.2d 701, 705 (N.Y. 2000) (quoting Judith Kaye, A Judge’s Perspec-
tive on Jury Reform from the Other Side of the Jury Box, 36 JUDGES’ J. 18, 21 (1997)). 
243 See Who Is Eligible, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, http://www.ajs.org/jc/juries/jc_whoserves_
eligible.asp (last visited Mar. 27, 2011) (stating that most states have trended toward eli-
minating exemptions to attain a broader representation for purposes of the ‘fair cross-
section’ requirement). 
244 JULIA VITULLO-MARTIN, BRIAN MAXEY & CHRIS CESARINI, FIVE YEARS OF JURY REFORM:  
WHAT JURORS ARE SAYING 12 (Vera Inst. of Just. ed., Aug. 2000) (finding that nearly half 
of doctors say that if they have to serve on juries, their patients will suffer). 
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or sole-proprietors of their business.245  Not exempting such potential 
jurors may place a unique weight on those individuals.  However, it 
should be noted that as of December 2008, only one state, Tennessee, 
specially included an automatic exemption for the self-employed.  As 
part of its jury reform efforts, Tennessee eliminated that automatic 
exemption as of January 1, 2009. 
So, while “young people, old people, poor people, deaf people, 
less educated people, college students, resident aliens, blue-collar 
workers, professional workers, felons, juvenile offenders, those not 
registered to vote, those opposed to the death penalty, those affiliated 
with the National Rifle Association, city residents, and residents of 
Minneapolis,”246 convicted felons, persons charged with felonies, and 
persons whose last name begins with letters W through Z may not 
have unique “flavors,” systematic exclusions of these groups from jury 
service would violate the Sixth Amendment because the resulting ve-
nire would be composed not of “the district,” but of an unconstitu-
tionally restrictive subset of “the district.” 
CONCLUSION 
The Sixth Amendment’s promise of a representative jury contin-
ues to be unfulfilled.  Much as the Court failed in preventing the 
widespread and persistent under-representation of women, African 
Americans, and other minorities on juries for almost two centuries 
after the Founding, so too the Court’s celebrated ‘fair cross-section’ 
jurisprudence has proved largely inefficacious.  A doctrine that once 
held much potential to serve as the means of ensuring representative 
juries has largely come to a jurisprudential standstill due in large part 
to the doctrinal conflicts created by the manner in which the Court 
chose to frame the ‘fair cross-section’ requirement.
If, instead of deriving the ‘fair cross-section’ requirement from the 
Sixth Amendment’s impartial jury clause, it were derived instead 
from the vicinage clause, the result would be a doctrine more faithful 
to the understanding of representativeness reflected in the adoption 
of the Sixth Amendment.  Such a textual reframing, moreover, would 
resolve the doctrinal conflict and jurisprudential paradox now con-
straining the ‘fair cross-section’ requirement and would revitalize the 
Sixth Amendment by precluding the categorical exclusions from jury 
service that are now prevalent in many jurisdictions.  
 
245  Id. at 10–11. 
246  Leipold, supra note 59, at 968–69 (citations omitted). 
